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The Respondent (hereinafter "Respondent" or "Mr. Richards") submits the following 
as his response brief in the above-referenced appeal to the \Jtah Supreme Court: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court granted Certiorari to Diana I^rown on January 20,2010. The 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Utah Court Appeals under 
U.C.A. §78A-3-102(3)(a) and the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure, Rule 45-51. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW^ 
On Certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of[Appeals' decision to determine 
whether that Court correctly reviewed the decision of the| Trial Court. Utah State Tax 
Commission v. Stevenson, 150 P.3d 521 (Utah 2006). Th^ Court of Appeals' decision is 
reviewed for correctness which means the Supreme Court decides the matter for itself and 
conclusions of law of the lower court are afforded no deference. Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Co. v Wall, 978 P.23 460 (Utah 1999). 
Whether cohabitation exists is a mixed question offset and law and the trial court's 
factual findings are accepted unless shown to be clearty erroneous and the ultimate 
conclusion is reviewed for correctness. Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, %L, 173 P.32 
223 (quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
A trial court's grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 56(c). 
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When deciding whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue 
of material fact, this court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. See id. Additionally, because summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law, the reviewing court gives the trial court's legal conclusions no 
deference and review their decision for correctness. See White v. GaryL. Deseelhorst, N.P. 
Ski Corp., 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Respondent Did Not 
Waive His Right to Appeal by Accepting Payment on the Judgment. 
Issue No. II: Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in its Construction and/or 
Application of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 (Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from a decision issued by the Utah Court 
of Appeals October 29,2009. That decision reviewed the final Judgment and Order of the 
Third District Court Judge Denise Lindberg, pursuant to a trial involving claims under 
common law marriage statute, paternity, and equitable theories of property division. 
The undisputed facts in this case would easily have established a common law 
marriage but for the fact that the trial court determined on summary judgment, that Mr. 
Richards did not file his petition to establish common law marriage within one year of 
termination of that alleged marriage and found that flaw to be jurisdictional which barred his 
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common law marriage claims. Without taking any evidence, the Court concluded that the 
parties' relationship terminated on the day Mr. Richards m0ved out of Ms. Brown's home. 
This ruling is contained in the Memorandum Decision Rfc: Partial Summary Judgment 
entered by the trial court January 8,2008. Addendum 4. 
In reviewing the common law marriage issue, the Court of Appeals held that an 
unsolemnized marriage requires that each of the five statutory elements be present and that 
the plain language of the statute requires only that the couple *'have cohabited at some time." 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals determination was that }he §30-1-4.5 relationship may 
not have been co-extensive with the date Mr. Richards moved out of Ms. Brown's home, and 
ordered remand on this issue. 
In brief, the relevant facts to establish a common law marriage in this case include, 
but are not limited to, a ten-year span of continuous cohabitation during which time the 
parties had a child who was 12 years old at the time of trial. That all the cohabitation took 
place in the home of Ms. Brown. That Ms. Brown refused to itiarry Mr. Richards in a formal 
sense despite his attempts to formalize the relationship. That Mr. Richards paid one-half the 
mortgage, half the household expenses and child costs throughout the relationship and that 
the parties maintained a detailed accounting of these matters. Mr. Richards also had 
substantial evidence of the parties' holding out their relationship as a marriage, but was 
barred from presenting that evidence at the time of trial baped on the Court's Summary 
Judgment Ruling that the common law marriage claim could [not be presented. 
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The trial court entered its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which 
is the final judgment and order appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. Addendum 3. The 
trial court concluded that Mr. Richards was entitled to compensation of $10,136 for 
improvements he made to the shared home under the theory of unjust enrichment. However, 
the trial court deemed compensation for his contribution to the mortgage over 10 years which 
was a stipulated sum of $71,100 as not meeting the standard of unjust enrichment, 
promissory estoppel, constructive trust or implied contract. The trial court limited the 
evidence presented at trial to equitable theories of recovery and refused to allow direct 
evidence of common law marriage. Nevertheless, by the end of the trial, the trial court stated 
that the parties had met the elements of common law marriage. (Transcript, page 183). Such 
a conclusion by the trial court underscores the weakness of the ruling and supports the 
decision of the Court of Appeals to remand the case for a hearing on whether the common 
law marriage elements were established in this case. 
The amount of $10,176 was paid by Ms. Brown to Mr. Richards and based on this 
payment, Ms. Brown now argues that the appeal should be barred. The Court of Appeals 
addressed this in footnote 9 of its opinion, holding that Utah law would not support such a 
waiver because Ms. Brown failed to file any Satisfaction of Judgment. Even after entry of 
that ruling, there has been no effort to file a Satisfaction of Judgment to date which continues 
to preclude Ms. Brown's appeal on this point. 
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STATEMENT OF FACT$ 
1. These parties were never married and have lone (1) child together, namely 
Stephanie A. Brown-Richards (DOB 03-29-1996), age 12 fct the time of trial 
2. It is undisputed that the parties began living together in May 1995 and 
Petitioner moved into a separate residence at the end of August 2005. (Tr. 14) During this 
10-year period, the parties resided in the home of Diana Bijown at 459 - 12th Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
3. The Respondent, Ms. Brown, alleges that the pjarties had an exclusive romantic 
relationship through at least the summer of 2001. Petitioner Steve Richards alleges the 
parties continued an exclusive monogamous relationship and common law marriage through 
December 31,2005, and he filed a paternity and common la^/ marriage action December 21, 
2006. (Record p.l). 
4. It is undisputed that while they lived together, t|ie parties shared in the payment 
of the mortgage expense of the residence and in division of monthly bills. The parties 
faithfully accounted for their joint expenses and the joint tr^al exhibits contained a sample 
of the monthly statements documenting specific expenses ft>r mortgage payments, utilities, 
groceries, clothes, taxes, home repair and all home and family expenses shared by the parties 
over 10 years. (Joint Trial Exhibit 11-A) 
5. During the 10-year relationship, Mr. Richards| was the only person who drove 
and owned a vehicle. He provided all the transportation f<j)r Ms. Brown and the child as 
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needed, and paid all costs of the vehicle purchase and operating expenses. (Joint Trial Exhibit 
15). 
6. It is undisputed that the parties established a joint parenting relationship with 
their daughter and both contributed equally to her expenses, and shared in all aspects of her 
care taking and parental matters. The parties agreed to abide by the Petitioner's proposed 
"Parenting Plan," to which they stipulated as a final order at trial to resolve the paternity and 
custody claims. The Parenting Plan continues the parties' obligation to share equally in the 
child's direct expenses, and grants the parties joint legal and physical custody of the minor 
child and an equal division of time (R. 17-22, 58-61). 
7. The parties referred to their relationship as a "marriage" and such was 
recognized by third parties. The IHC Employee newsletter of May 2005 had a cover photo 
of Ms. Brown, Mr. Richards, and their daughter Stephanie, referencing "Diana Brown and 
her husband Steve Richards." (Joint Trial Exhibit 7). Upon separating, Ms. Brown wrote a 
letter to family and Mends referencing the end of their "marriage." (Diana Brown Testimony 
Transcript p. 90; Joint Trial Exhibit 8). 
8. By the end of the trial, even the court was convinced that the parties had met 
the elements of a common law marriage, and stated "... by both of their testimonies, so the 
undisputed testimony is that the parties treated themselves, irrespective of whether or not 
there is a common law marriage, which I have found there is not, for reasons that have 
nothing to do with the substance of the matter, but they certainly held themselves out that 
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way by the evidence that I have in front of me." (Tr. 183) 
9. Upon separation, the parties attended the cl^ss for divorcing parents and 
attended mediation with Marcie Keck, where they reached agreement on parenting terms and 
finances for their child. (Tr., 21, 123). They scheduled additional mediation sessions to 
address financial and property issues, but Ms. Brown cancelled these sessions (Tr. 21, 22). 
The trial court found as follows: "Petitioner testified credibly Ithat he did not immediately file 
his Petition because he was expecting that the parties would ^ngage in additional mediation 
with a view towards resolution or reconciliation. As a result of this delay, the Petition was 
not filed until December 21, 2006, more than a year after Petitioner had moved out of the 
residence." (Findings, [^4). 
10. Mr. Richards asked Ms. Brown to marry hijn several times (Tr.19). She 
refused, as she had recently been divorced from Derek Priest in September 1991. (Divorce 
Decree, Joint Trial Exhibit 12). Yet, it seemed important tcj Ms. Brown that she appear to 
be married for the sake of the child. (Tr. 21) 
11. In the divorce of Ms. Brown from Mr. Priest, stye was awarded the home at 459 
- 12th Avenue and agreed to pay Mr. Priest $11,800 for his Equity. (Tr. 52) 
12. In the common law marriage of these parties, Ms. Brown stated to Mr. 
Richards she would treat him as she had treated Mr. Priesl), by paying him equity he had 
earned in the home. (Diana Brown testimony, Tr. 100). 
13. Ms. Brown testified that she believed payment by Mr. Richards towards the 
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mortgage was essentially the same as paying equity. (Tr. 98). 
14. During the ten (10) years they lived together, the parties were both employed 
in the healthcare field, earning substantially similar incomes. The Financial Declarations 
filed in the case showed Mr. Richards earned $6,131 gross monthly with IHC in June 2007, 
and Ms. Brown earned $5,767 gross monthly as an R.N. in July 2007. (Joint Trial Exhibits 
10, 16). 
15. Mr. Richards alleges that during the relationship of the parties, Ms. Brown 
stated he was entitled to a financial interest in the home and would be added to the title, 
although she never did so. Ms. Brown acknowledged at trial, as found by the trial court, that 
she made statements over the years that (1) referenced how she had dealt with her ex-
husband by giving him one-half the equity in the home, (2) that she would treat Mr. Richards 
equitably, and (3) that she would be willing to put Mr. Richards on the title to the house. She 
testified that those statements were always subject to having Mr. Richards first pay her for 
one-half of her equity in the home. (Diana Brown Testimony Tr. 97-98). Mr. Richards 
disputed this testimony, saying he had "no recollection" of there being a pre-condition that 
he pay one-half of the equity in the house before his name could go on the title. (Steve 
Richards Tr. 36, 41). Ms. Brown acknowledged she was aware it was important to Mr. 
Richards to have his name on the title and that he periodically raised this issue. Although 
Ms. Brown pointed to the two (2) refinances of the home as evidence that Mr. Richards had 
opportunity to arrange "to pay her for her equity," had he chosen to do so, she also 
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acknowledged that she never identified for Mr. Richards a specific amount of money that 
would satisfy her in order to get his name on the title. (Diana Brown Tr. 99) She also 
acknowledged that she never seriously pursued any efforts tc\ put Mr. Richards on the title. 
The trial court stated: "The court finds the testimony of Petitioner [Richards] to be more 
credible than that of Respondent [Brown] on the issue of Respondent's representations to 
Petitioner that she would treat him equitably [on the issue of Ijris interest in the home] if they 
ever separated. Petitionn hiulnnn Invn mnrriai whereas jRespondent had been through 
a divorce and a property division previously. Respondent therefore had a greater 
understanding of what a 'split' between them would entail vs^ ith respect to any distribution 
of property." (trial court Findings, ^ [20). 
16. There was no dispute as to the accounting established at trial that Mr. Richards 
paid Ms. Brown $71,100 specifically towards the mortgage during the 10-year relationship, 
and that his investment in repairs and improvements was approximately $ 12,470. (Testimony 
of Diana Brown, Tr. 96, testimony of Mr. Richards Tr. 25, J|)int Trial Exhibits 5,6). 
17. In the litigation, Mr. Richards requested a fincjing of common law marriage, 
and Ms. Brown filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, stating the claim was untimely. The 
trial court issued a Memorandum Decision finding that the ctlaim failed, as it was not filed 
within the jurisdictional requirements of the con imon la vv marriage statute, which reqi lires 
a iiniiH within one (1) year of "termination" oi tin relationship. The trial court based its 
decision solely on the finding that cohabitation ended August 31, 2005, not on any more 
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probative analysis of when the common law relationship terminated under the statute. 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 121) The trial court also limited evidence and argument on the 
elements of common law marriage at trial. (Memorandum Decision, R. 121) 
18. Mr. Richards filed his Verified Petition December 21, 2006, and alleged the 
parties' relationship ended December 31,2005, when the parties ceased holding themselves 
out as married, began to date others, and were no longer living together. Until that time, they 
continued sharing holidays, he kept a key to the house and entered as needed, the parties 
remained monogamous, and nothing changed as to joint parenting and support of the child. 
Mr. Richards also retained Ms. Brown as beneficiary on his life insurance and retirement 
accounts after separation. (Findings, f 14) (Tr. 16-18). 
19. The Verified Petition filed by Mr. Richards pled common law marriage, as well 
as alternate equitable theories of recovery and property division, including implied contract, 
unjust enrichment, contract for services, partnership or constructive trust. (R.l-8) 
20. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Mr. Richards had stated a 
claim for unjust enrichment. The court ordered Ms. Brown to reimburse to Mr. Richards the 
expenditures he made for a deck, swamp cooler, sprinkler system, and ceiling fan in the 
amount of $10,136. (Findings, f34) The Court denied any other categories of expenditure, 
including the $71,100 paid towards the mortgage during the 10-year period, any expenditure 
towards home maintenance, a total of $ 12,470, including part of the deck cost, lawn service 
costs of $ 1,024.50, and other repairs. (Tr. 146, Joint Exhibit 6). Mr. Richards also quantified 
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the costs incurred by him to purchase, insure and maintain the only automobile used by the 
parties during the 10-year relationship, in the amount of $38,565, and he requested 
reimbursement of half the expenditure. (Joint Exhibit 15, Findings, ^ |s35-39). 
21. The trial court reasoned that home maintenance expenses, such as lawn care, 
do not "add value" to the home and the Court could thus not determine how these expenses 
conferred a specific benefit on Ms. Brown, as required for a| finding of unjust enrichment. 
(Findings ^35). 
22. The court considered and rejected Mr. Richards' other theories for recovery: 
Promissory estoppel, contract and constructive trust. The Jud^e based her reasoning on what 
Mr. Richards did not do: He did not establish that his actions in failing to establish a more 
formal equity interest in the property were "prudent," and thijis failed by a preponderance of 
the evidence to establish the elements of promissory estoppel. (Findings f^s 41-42). 
23. After the trial court ruling, Ms. Brown tendered payment for the full judgment 
amount of $10,136 which was accepted by Mr. Richards. 
24. Mr. Richards filed an appeal to the Utah Coi^ rt of Appeals alleging the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in analyzing the common law marriage statute and the 
paragraph concerning when a relationship terminates for purposes of that law. In its opinion, 
the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Order of Partial Summary Judgment by the trial court 
on the common law marriage claim. The reviewing court held that there were material 
disputed facts as to when the common law relationship temiinated that must be resolved to 
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determine whether Mr. Richards' claim is barred by the statute of repose. The Court of 
Appeals reviewed the five statutory elements required to establish a common law marriage 
and found that the plain language of statute required only that the couple "has cohabited at 
some time." Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that termination of the common law 
relationship may not have been co-extensive with the date Mr. Richards moved out of Ms. 
Brown's home. 
25. Mr. Richards also appealed the trial court's ruling on the issue of unjust 
enrichment. Although he was awarded part of his claims for capital improvements to the 
shared residence under this theory, the Court would not apply the unjust enrichment or other 
equitable theories of relief to the payments Mr. Richards had paid towards the home 
mortgage and other shared expenses. On this issue, the Court of Appeals affirmedthe trial 
court's decision finding that Mr. Richards received something in return for his mortgage 
payments, a place to live, and this was outside of the purview of unjust enrichment, which 
requires closer something to a true winfall. 
26. Mr. Richards appealed the trial court's rejection of his equitable theories of 
relief including promissory estoppel, the theory of implied contract and constructive trust and 
the trial court's ruling was also affirmed on these issues. 
27. In her brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, Ms. Brown raise the issue of whether 
the Appeal was barred by Mr. Richards accepting payment for the partial judgment. The 
Court of Appeals held that there was no bar to the appeal as there had been no satisfaction 
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of judgment filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Court of Appeals recognized that the Utah Common Law Marriage Statute 
needed a way to define when the relationship terminates for purposes of triggering the statute 
of repose. The Court's decision creates a workable rule consistent with a plain language 
interpretation of the statute. The common law marriage statute requires parties to meet the 
significant burden of establishing five (5) separate factors arjd once established, a common 
law marriage is treated for all intents and purposes as a [marriage, and divorce law is 
applicable upon the end of that relationship. The trial court herein treated as dispositive, only 
one (1) of the five (5) factors, that is, the factor of ending lining together, and deemed that 
day as a per se termination of the relationship. There is no Statutory or legal precedent for 
this finding, which was made pursuant to a summary judgment motion brought before the 
Commissioner. The court thereafter limited trial evidence ar)id discovery consistent with its 
ruling. Importantly and after hearing testimony at trial, the cc^ urt was nonetheless convinced 
that there was a common law marriage in this case and m^kes this reference in the trial 
transcript. On this point the parties' testimony was consistent, all exhibits were stipulated 
including documentation that the parties had established a general reputation as married, and 
used that terminology towards one another. Mr. Richards alleges that his moving out of the 
marital home should be deemed a separation, as he was hopeful of reconciliation and the 
parties were jointly engaged in mediation efforts and nearly all financial commitments 
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continued on a joint basis. Mr. Richards testified that he was totally unaware that there was 
a one(l) year limitation triggered by his voluntary move from the marital residence. Mr. 
Richards proposed to the Court of Appeals that a better approach would be for the trial court 
to take a case-by-case analysis of what constitutes termination of a common law relationship, 
given his strong claim to a common law marriage, his good faith and prudent efforts towards 
reconciliation which promotes marriage stability, and the same principles of equity and 
fairness. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Richards and reversed the Order of 
Partial Summary Judgment on the unsolemnized marriage claim. The Appellate Court held 
that there were material, disputed facts as to when the U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 relationship 
terminated. The Court of Appeals found that the plain language of the statute requires only 
that the couple "have cohabited at some time" and remanded the case to the trial court to 
consider evidence on whether or not the end of cohabitation may not have been coextensive 
with the termination of the relationship. The Court of Appeals interpreted the plain language 
of the statute to conclude that several of the elements were stated in the present tense and 
when those factors ended, there was a clear end to the relationship. However, the analysis 
also showed that at least two of the elements were phrased in the past tense and a review of 
those elements required a more detailed analysis by the trial court as the end of those factors 
would often be less clear. 
2. The $10,176 paid to Mr. Richards in this case did not satisfy the judgment of 
the court because separate and independent claims remained. The issue was raised at the 
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Court of Appeals as to whether acceptance of these funds barred the appeal. The Court of 
Appeals held that it did not as there had not been a satisfactiori of judgment filed. This result 
is consistent with Utah law and in particular, the leading ca$e of Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 
1142 (Utah 1973). This sets out the general rule that an appea|l may be waived by acceptance 
of payment unless these remain separate and independent claims. In the Jensen case, the 
Court found there was no mootness as separate and independent claims remained. Certainly, 
in the present case, Mr. Richards filed an appeal based on numerous grounds and separate 
claims which remain even after the payment. Significa4t among those would be the 
challenge to the application of unjust enrichment doctrine to bther claims and application of 
the Utah Common Law Marriage Statute. Importantly, Ms. B^own is not harmed by applying 
the Jensen exception to this case because under any circumstances, she would have owed the 
funds to Mr. Richards. As such, the ruling of the Court of Appeals not to bar the appeal is 
consistent with Utah law and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT TO tlOLD MR. RICHARDS DID 
NOT LOSE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL BY ACCENTING PAYMENT ON THE 
JUDGMENT. 
In presenting this issue, Ms. Brown does no more th&i repeat arguments previously 
rejected by the Court of Appeals, whose decision she characterizes only as bad public policy, 
and not as a mis-application of law. In her brief to the Court! of Appeals, Ms. Brown argued 
that the appeal was moot based on her having voluntarily pfrid the financial award ordered 
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by the trial court to Mr. Richards. In reviewing this contention, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated at footnote 9 that Utah law would not support such a waiver as there had been no 
Satisfaction of Judgment executed or filed in this case. To date, there has still been no 
satisfaction of judgment executed or filed in this case, which continues to preclude Ms. 
Brown's claims on this theory. The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Brown's payment did not 
render the issue moot due to the existence of separate and unrelated claims. The Court of 
Appeals referenced the case of Hollingsworth v. Farmer 'sins. Co., 655 P.2d 637,639 (Utah 
1982), which decision discusses the rule that when a judgment creditor accepts payment and 
executes a satisfaction of judgment, the controversy becomes moot. Moreover, the 
Hollingsworth Court stated that ccthe general rule does not necessarily prevent an appeal as 
to separate and independent claims if it is shown that a controversy remains in regard 
thereto." Citing, Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973). 
The decision of the Court of Appeals that Mr. Richards' appeal was not waived is also 
directly supported by the leading case of Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973). Again 
discussing the general rule that an appeal may be waived if the controversy has become moot 
by payment, the Court recited the aphorism "if the reason for the rule is not present, the rule 
does not apply." Id, At 1143. The Supreme Court held that the general rule does not prevent 
an appeal as to separate and independent claims where the controversy has not been fully 
settled. Certainly, in the present case, Mr. Richards appealed on numerous grounds and 
theories. Even focusing on the issue of the financial award alone, Mr. Richards appealed 
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based on his contention that the financial award was insufficient and that the trial court's 
application of the theory of unjust enrichment was misapplied as it rewarded only one 
category of damages (home improvement expenses) and not another (mortgage expense). 
The appeal included errors in applying the common law marriage statute and equitable relief 
among other challenges to the trial court ruling. Ms. Brown! also asserts her belief that the 
Court of Appeals' decision represents "bad public policy", (petitioner's Brief, p. 14). The 
Respondent's opinion on public policy is insufficient/?^ se to reverse the Court of Appeals 
decision on this point which is amply supported by current legal precedent. To the contrary, 
the rules of civil procedure which require entry of a satisfaction of judgment represent well-
established public policy by providing finality to litigants ai^ d clarity to creditors. 
Ms. Brown discusses the acceptance of the benefit doctrine and references the case 
of Trees v, Lewis^ 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987). That 4octrine and case are readily 
distinguishable from the present facts. Trees involved only a $ingle issue, possession of land 
and payment of a purchase price as ordered by the trial cornet and at the time of appeal, the 
court orders had been entirely fulfilled wherein the seller had moved from the land and 
accepted payment from the buyer. As such, the controversy was entirely moot. That is 
distinguishable from the present case where the appeal presented numerous, separate and 
independent claims and where payment on part of the claims did not in any respect resolve 
the entire controversy. This is the type of fact situation that faflls within the exception created 
by the case of Jensen v. Eddy. In the final analysis, there ar^ only three options on how this 
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issue of payment and satisfaction could have played out as follows: 
(1) Ms. Brown could have presented a satisfaction of judgment which would have 
given Mr. Richards the opportunity to object, or require that it be a partial 
satisfaction with the retention of appeal rights; 
(2) Mr. Richards could have tendered and filed a partial satisfaction of judgment 
given his intent to appeal; and 
(3) If Ms. Brown had not paid the judgment without a stay of judgment in place, 
Mr. Richards could have successfully pursued Ms. Brown for the judgment, 
without consequence or harm to his appeal. Because Ms. Brown did not 
appeal, she clearly owed the $10,176 to Mr. Richards who was entitled to 
collect the full judgment amount no matter what the outcome of the appeal. 
The option number "(3)" above clearly takes this issue out of the analytical 
framework of the Trees case. There is no shifting of risk in favor of the creditor by virtue 
of the payment in this case being paid in full. Unlike, where the seller of land both sold the 
land, moved from the property and received full payment and filed an appeal which, if 
unsuccessful, could have resulted in a requirement that he repay the buyer - there is no such 
fact scenario possible in this case. Rather, the Trees appellant was taking a second bite at the 
apple trying to improve his already fully executed contract of sale and in the Richards case, 
there was no scenario that would reduce the payment obligation to Mr. Richards which had 
been fully paid. Thus, the appellant's argument that the appeal should be found moot based 
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on payment in this case is simply inapplicable based on tne exception set forth in Jensen v. 
Eddy and the circumstance herein. 
In summary, the first issue presented by Ms. Browri's request for Supreme Court 
review should be denied on several grounds. First, that no Satisfaction of Judgment has been 
filed, which is a clear prerequisite before an issue is deemed moot or an appeal deemed to 
be waived. Second, that the appeal of Mr. Richards presented separate and independent 
claims showing that the controversy was not entirely moot (Jthe Jensen exception). Third, 
that Respondent has not carried her burden of showing any ejrror by the Court of Appeals in 
applying current law to this issue and merely asserting the re$ult is bad policy is insufficient 
to meet the standard of review for reversal. Fourth, the acceptance of benefit doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case as separate, independent claims regain despite the payment which 
would have to be paid by Ms. Brown regardless of the result of any appeal. 
H. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE AFFIRMJ3D IN ITS CONSTRUCTION 
AND APPLICATIONS OF THE UTAH COMMON \AW MARRIAGE STATUTE 
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute is set forth at 0.C.A. §30-1-4.5 and contains 
five elements that must be established for an unsolemnized marriage to arise. In the Richards 
case, the evidence of common law marriage was barred at th^ trial court based on the Partial 
Summary Judgment ruling by District Court Judge Lindbetg that the end of cohabitation 
triggered the one-year statute for filing a common law marriage claim, which time had been 
exceeded in this case. The parties did not dispute that Mr. Richards moved out of the home 
on about September 1,2005 and he filed his Petition for paternity, to establish common law 
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marriage and other equitable claims on December 21, 2006 after a lengthy separation and 
mediation process. The trial court judge deemed the failure to file the Petition within one 
year from the moving out date was a jurisdictional bar to considering common law marriage 
issues at trial. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals made two important rulings to clarify 
and interpret the statute, resulting in a remand on this issue. 
First, the Court of Appeals' opinion carefully reviewed the plain language employed 
in the statute, describing the five factors of the unsolemnized marriage statute and held in this 
case that because "the relationship described in Subsection (1) is one comprised of five 
identified factors joined by the conjunctive "and," see id Section 30-1-4.5(1), we conclude 
that termination of an unsolemnized marriage occurs at the time any one of the statutory 
factors ceases to exist. (Footnote 10)." Court of Appeals Opinion, f^ 20. 
Second, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of how to define termination of a 
common law relationship by the following statutory paragraph: 
" (2) the determination or establishment of a marriage under this 
section must occur during the relationship described in 
subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship 
U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) 
In addressing this issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals closely analyzed the plain 
language of this Statute noting that "the legislature used different verb tenses for certain 
requirements." The Court of Appeals' Opinion ^25. It concluded that on the issue of 
cohabitation, th e requirement is stated in the past tense that the parties "have cohabited". The 
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parties in this case clearly agreed that they both had cohabited in the past, which is all that 
subsection (1) of the statute requires. Consequently, the Courtl of Appeals held that "the date 
that Richards moved out does not, as a matter of law, determine when the relationship 
terminated by the failure of one of the elements required by §30-1-4.5(1)". Court of Appeals 
Opinion, f25. The Court of Appeals remanded for the trial c}ourt to determine the facts of 
when the relationship terminated in this case. 
Appellant suggests that the Court of Appeals undertook merely a "a grammarian 
exercise9' to create an entirely new standard. This is far from accurate. The Court of Appeals 
dealt only with the exact language in the statute and in its decision, the Court applied and 
clarified the statutory language to the circumstances of thfs case. In Footnote 10, the 
Appellate Court noted the important distinction that two of the factors contained in the 
unsolemnized marriage statute had requirements expressed ih the past tense and that such 
requirements "do not technically cease and thus do not] automatically terminate the 
relationship for purposes of triggering the statute of reposej" (Emphasis added) Court of 
Appeals Opinion, % 20, footnote 10. Specifically discussing |the factor of cohabitation, the 
Opinion notes that two of the five elements stated in the statute to establish a common law 
marriage are in the past tense noting subpart (c) clearly states that the parties "have 
cohabited" and subpart (e) discusses parties "who hold themselves out as and have acquired" 
a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. Tlie Court states that its duty to 
interpret statutes is first to "give effect to the legislative intent as evidenced by the plain 
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language in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve", citing Utah Dept of 
Trans, v. Ivers, 2009 UT. 56, § 22. Thus, when the five elements of the statute are reviewed 
carefully, it becomes clear that the plain language anticipates that the element of cohabitation 
which is stated in the past tense, should be treated differently than the statutory elements 
stated in the present tense. The conclusion by the Court of Appeals focuses on clarification 
of the plain language and is not a new interpretation. 
Importantly, the Court of Appeals notes that this approach has previously been used 
in the common law marriage case of Kunz v. Kunz, 136 P.3d 1278 (2006 Utah App.), where 
one of the five elements had ceased to exist by virtue of the husband's legal inability to enter 
into a solemnized marriage due to his intervening legal marriage to another. In that case, the 
husband could not meet the requirement (stated in the present tense) that he be capable of 
entering into a solemnized marriage. Consistent with this approach, the Court of Appeals 
noted that Subparagraph (l)(c) of the statute, the cohabitation element requires only that the 
parties "have cohabited" at some time in their relationship. Thus, the Court of Appeals 
decision in fact explicates the plain language of the statute and does not over-interpret or 
revise it in any way. 
There is simply no statement in the Utah Common Law Marriage statute that the end 
of cohabitation as a matter of law, equates to when the relationship terminates. Albeit, this 
is the conclusion made by Judge Lindberg in her Memorandum Decision on Partial Summary 
Judgment. However, if this had been the ruling of the Court of Appeals, that would be open 
-22-
to challenge as over-interpreting and expanding the legislative intent- clearly going beyond 
the plain language of the statute. In conclusion, the Court ojf Appeals found that a remand 
was necessary to allow Mr. Richards to present evidence that despite his move from the 
home, his Section 3-1 -.4.5 relationship may not have terminated until a later date. The Court 
of Appeals carefully executed its duty to interpret and clarify the plain language of the statute 
as passed by the legislature. In ordering a remand, the Court of Appeals has correctly 
directed the trial court to fully consider the issue of whether) the elements of common law 
marriage can be shown in this case, and if so, whether the filing of the Petition was within 
one year of termination of any one of the five factors. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION PROMOTES THE POLICY OF 
STABLE MARRIAGE AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CASE LAW ON 
COHABITATION. 
In her Brief, Ms. Brown states that the opinion of the Court of Appeals "contravenes 
the very purposes" previously found regarding the statute ofj repose as applied to common 
law marriage. She contends that the rule will thus encourage delayed adjudications of 
common law marriages long after separation and creates an [unworkable standard. This is 
simply not the case since in passing the common law marriag^ statute, the legislature clearly 
intended to give validity to long term, stable relationships. By creating a multi-element rule 
to determine the existence and end of such a relationship, tjie legislature was also giving 
discretion to the trial court to handle the matter on a fact specilfic basis by acknowledging the 
variety and scope of evidence which needs to be presented to meet the elements of the 
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statute. If the legislature had intended the common law marriage relationship to be ended on 
a finite basis such as the end of sharing a common residence, it could have done so, but 
clearly did not. The Court of Appeals has now given clarity to how a trial court is to analyze 
termination of a relationship and has held that it occurs upon proof of the failure of any one 
of the elements of §30-1-4.5(1). The Court of Appeals clarifies that the three elements stated 
in the present tense can be more objectively defined to show termination of a relationship and 
two factors stated in the past tense are less clearly defined but must have been present at 
some time in the relationship. 
In a practical application, the Court of Appeals' Opinion decision that the common 
law marriage statute does not require the parties to be presently cohabiting is a workable and 
realistic standard. It acknowledges the fact that parties in intimate relationships may need 
a separation of some duration and then resume their relationship. This is human nature and 
is supported by Utah law and policy which includes waiting periods before a divorce is final, 
U.C.A. §30-3-18(1) educational courses to advocate counseling and mediation as alternatives 
to divorce U.C.A. §30-3-18(3); and a new process for "temporary separation orders" U.C.A. 
§30-3-4.5 which allows litigants to separate with temporary orders without having to file for 
divorce. All of these methods are intended to slow the impulse to divorce and give parties 
tools to reconcile or separate with less conflict. Indeed, in the Supreme Court, common law 
marriage case of Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 538 (Utah 2001) the parties had a lengthy formal 
marriage, became divorced, resumed cohabitation where they met the common law marriage 
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criteria as found by the courts and then lived separately but sti|ll continued all elements of the 
common law marriage. Cohabitation in that case was deemed to be ended when Mrs. Clark 
denied Mr. Clark access to her separate dwelling. There is simply no reason to remove the 
discretion from the trial court in analyzing the numerous fact Scenarios that can be presented 
in this arena. If the legislature had intended a more definitive standard to establish 
termination of a common law marriage relationship, it could| have done so, but deferring to 
the trial court process on that complex element is reasonably and workable 
Utah law defining and applying the concept of cohabitation has evolved significantly 
over time. We now have different definitions of cohabitation| for different purposes, such as 
in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the term cohabitant includes m|any categories of persons who 
are not necessarily husband and wife. SeeXJ.CA. §78B-7-10$(2)(2008). In the recent Court 
of Appeals case of Myers v. Myers 2010 Utah App 74 653 Lftah Adv. Rep 7, the definition 
of cohabitation for purposes of termination of alimony has rjow been clarified. The Court 
of Appeals discusses the Supreme Court interpretation of the word in the case ofHaddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1984) which generally meant ' to live together as husband and 
wife." In this new ruling, the Court of Appeals emphasizes tfyat economic benefits must also 
exist to find cohabitation under current law. The opinion notes that economic factors are 
required to create an award of alimony and cannot be ignored when trying to establish 
cohabitation as a basis to terminate alimony. Thus, although [findings of common residency 
and sexual contact are key elements as to whether two people |have a relationship resembling 
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a marriage, the inquiry should not end there and to determine whether the parties entered into 
a relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife as required by 
Haddow, economic connections must be reviewed. In the Myers case, the Court found the 
spouse had not been cohabitating for purposes of terminating alimony when she may have 
lived with a boyfriend and had a sexual relationship, but that they did not share a common 
household expenses, shared decision making or shared meals. This case is significant in its 
broadening of the definition of cohabitation to include sharing of economic benefits. 
Certainly, under that definition, Mr. Richards and Ms. Brown continued to share economic 
benefits and nearly every other element of their common law marriage even after they ceased 
living together. As such, the Court of Appeals was correct to direct a remand in this case for 
the trial court to consider the totality of circumstances in applying the definition of 
cohabitation to the termination of relationship concept. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' rulings should be affirmed m all respects being challenged by 
this appeal. The requirement of filing a satisfaction of judgment is established in the rules 
and policy of Utah Civil Procedures pfor good reason. That requirement was not met in this 
case and as such, the Court of Appeals acted correctly to reject Appellant's argument that the 
appeal was moot. The facts of this case certainly fall within the exception created by the 
Jensen v. Eddy case. 
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' interpretation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 
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which provides a reasonable and needed clarification of the Common law marriage statute. 
The Court followed a plain language interpretation as required with statutory construction 
and creates a workable standard by treating the present tensq factors differently than those 
stated in the past tense. This allows trial courts to exercise di$cretion in the cases presented 
in this area where the evidence is so varied. It also allows realistic application of the Utah 
law on cohabitation. 
Respectfully submitted this (& day of May 2010. 
"SUZANNRMARELIUS 
TRACEYM. WATSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utafc 84111 
(801)746-7443 
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ADDENDUM I 
U.C.A. §30-1.4.5 
VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE NOT SOLEMNIZED 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chkpter shall be legal and valid if a 
court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of al contract between a man and a 
woman who 
(a) are of legal age and capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entenng a solemnized mamage und^r the provisions of this chapter, 
(c) have cohabited, 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations, ai)id 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage unddr this section must occur during 
the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that 
relationship Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested in any 
form, and may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases 
History: C. 1953,30-1-4.5, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 246, § 2; 2004, ch. 261, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2004 amendment, effective March 23, 2004, in Subsection (1), substituted 
"a man and a woman" for "two consenting parties" in the introductory <plause and added "of legal age and" 
in Subsection (1)(a) 
Severability Clauses. - Laws 1987, ch 246, § 5 provided that if iny provision of Chapter 246, or the 
application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invjalid the remainder of the chapter is 
to be given effect without the invalid provision or application 
Cross-References. - Marriage, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 29 
€) 2009 Matthew Bendei & Company Inc a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights leserved Use of this pioduct is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bendei Mastei Agieement 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
[^l Steve Richards appeals the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Diana Brown on Richards's claim that the 
parties had an unsolemnized marriage pursuant to Utah Code 
section 30-1-4.5. Richards next challenges the trial court's 
order, which denied him an interest in the equity in Brown's home 
and reimbursement for home maintenance expenses Richards incurred 
while living with Brown. Finally, Richards contends that the 
trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to conduct 
adequate discovery by allowing Brown's motion for a protective 
order. We reverse the order of partial summary judgment on the 
unsolemnized marriage claim. We affirm the trial court's 
decision in favor of Brown on the equitabl^ claims and its entry 
of a protective order. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 Richards and Brown lived together m Brown's home1 from May 
1995 to September 2005.2 Although Richards proposed several 
times, Brown never accepted, and thus, the parties never married. 
They have one child (Daughter), who was born m 1996. 
'1J3 Throughout the relationship, the parties maintained separate 
banking accounts but shared living expenses and costs associated 
with Daughter. Over the ten-year period, Richards contributed 
$71,100 to Brown's mortgage, initially paying $400 per month, 
voluntarily increasing his monthly payment to $550 following the 
birth of Daughter, and again voluntarily increasing his payment 
to $650 m 2003. Brown's monthly mortgage payments varied, 
starting at $1187 when Richards moved m and increasing to $1516 
m 2003.3 Brown promised to treat Richards fairly and to give 
him an interest m the home equity. Richards also testified that 
Brown promised to put his name on the title to the home. Brown 
conceded that she made these promises but maintained that they 
were always conditional upon Richards first paying her one-half 
of the existing equity and contributing to the mortgage and other 
expenses. Brown never indicated that she thought of Richards as 
a tenant, and she did not report his monthly payments as rental 
income on her tax returns.4 The trial court found Richards's 
testimony to be more credible than Brown's. 
1(4 The parties' remaining household and child expenses were 
divided evenly. For most expenses, Brown tallied the 
1. Brown purchased the home m 1989 with her ex-husband. As 
part of the divorce settlement m 1991, Brown paid her ex-husband 
$11,800 m exchange for his relinquishment of his interest m the 
home. 
2. The trial court found that Richards moved out of Brown's home 
in either August or September 2005. For purposes of our review 
of the grant of partial summary judgment, we use the date most 
favorable to Richards--September 2 005. 
3. The mortgage payments adjusted both upward and downward 
during the ten years of cohabitation. At least two increases 
were attributable to Brown's equity withdrawals while refinancing 
the home. Richards did not receive any portion of those 
withdrawals, and on neither occasion did Brown add his name to 
the title 
4 . The parties filed separate tax returns but strategically 
allocated exemptions and deductions to maximize their refunds, 
which they split equally. 
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expenditures bimonthly and presented Richarjds 
one-half the costs, which he always "paid w 
Occasionally, expenditures were not included 
tally, but the parties shared these expense 
would pay for them For example, Richards 
$10,000 toward significant home improvement 
the deck, installing a swamp cooler and cei 
up a sprinkler system Richards also owned 
he used for his personal transportation, Daught 
transportation, and family outings and errands, 
have a driver license and did not drive dur|mg 
with a bill for 
ithout question." 
m the bimonthly 
s by alternating who 
contributed over 
s, including replacing 
ling fan, and setting 
the only car, which 
er ' s 
Brown did not 
the relationship. 
f5 After Richards moved out of Brown's hcjme m September 2005, 
the parties continued to socialize together through December 
2 005, including celebrating Brown's and Richards's birthdays, 
Thanksgiving, and Christmas as a family In October 2 005, the 
parties engaged m mediation to resolve custody issues. The 
parties also attended an education class for divorcing parents 
and mailed a letter announcing their ,,dlvoIjce,, to family and 
friends.5 Although they initially intended to mediate the 
property distribution, Brown later canceled that mediation. 
Richards testified that he delayed filing a petition for 
adjudication of unsolemnized marriage because he believed the 
parties would either resolve the property dispute through 
mediation or reconcile.6 By early 2 006, Richards realized that 
reconciliation was no longer a possibility. 
pursuant 
Code 
^6 In December 2006, Richards filed a Verli 
Paternity and Related Matters, m which he 
either recognize the parties as married 
unsolemnized marriage statute, see Utah 
(2007),7 or award him an equitable interest 
Brown filed a motion for partial summary J\J\ 
unsolemnized marriage claim, arguing that 
petition outside the one-year statute of rdpo 
hearing, the domestic commissioner recommended 
motion for partial summary judgment be grarjted 
accepted the commissioner's recommendation 
«i 
fied Petition for 
asked the court to 
to the 
Ann. § 30-1-4.5 
m Brown's home. 
dgment on the 
chards filed his 
se. Following a 
that Brown's 
The trial court 
because a 
5. It is unclear from the record when the (parties mailed the 
letter. 
6. Richards was also unaware that he had to file a petition to 
have their relationship recognized as a legal marriage within one 
year of the termination of the relationship!. 
7. We cite to the current codification of [Utah Code section 30-
1-4.5 because the current version is identical to the version m 
effect when Richards filed the petition. 
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"relationship [for purposes of unsolemnized marriage] is 
terminated by cessation of the [required element of] 
cohabitation." The trial court concluded that there was no 
factual dispute that cohabitation had ended by September 2005, 
and Richards!s petition was filed over a year later. 
%1 The equitable claims were reserved for a bench trial. At 
trial, Richards testified that Brown promised as early as 
September L996 to put his name on the title of the home. 
Richards aLso indicated that at various points during the 
relationship he "felt insecure about [his] financial position 
. . . m the family" and that Brown "recognized that [insecurity] 
. . . and she assured [him] on several occasions that [he could] 
just take her word for it "--that she would treat him like she did 
her ex-husband. Yet when Brown twice refinanced the house during 
the relationship, she did not add Richards to the title. 
Nevertheless, Richards failed to take any steps to ensure that he 
was given legal interest m the home.8 
[^8 Richards also presented evidence that he contributed over 
$12,000 to home improvements and an additional $2000 to home 
maintenance over the ten-year period. The trial court concluded 
that Brown had received a benefit equal to the cost of the 
purchase and installation of the deck, swamp cooler, sprinkler 
system, and ceiling fan. Accordingly, it ordered Brown to 
reimburse Richards $10,136 under an unjust enrichment: theory. 
The trial court rejected, however, Richards's additional expenses 
because it concluded that these expenses were more appropriately 
categorized as home maintenance expenditures. The trial court 
declined to reimburse Richards for his home maintenance 
contributions because these expenses did not enhance the value of 
the home m such a manner that it conferred "a specific benefit 
upon [Brown] which in fairness she should be required to repay." 
Brown asserts that she has paid Richards on that judgment.9 
8. Richards also testified that m 1999 or 2000, m response to 
his repeated requests to be added to the title, Brown brought 
home paperwork to refinance the house. Richards told her he 
wanted to think about whether refinancing made financial sense 
for them. Two days later, the paperwork was "gone." Despite the 
sudden disappearance of the paperwork, Richards maintained that 
the fact Brown brought home paperwork "gave [him] confidence that 
[Brown] was interested m [his] financial position." 
9. Brown argues that because she has voluntarily paid the 
judgment and Richards has accepted it, the controversy is moot 
and Richards has waived his right to appeal. See generally 
Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (1973) 
(continued...) 
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H9 With respect to Richards's contributions to 
the trial court concluded that Richards failed to 
amount of the benefit conferred upon Brown, leavi 
court unable to calculate the appropriate amount 
be reimbursed under a theory of unjust enri chment 
court likewise concluded that Richards failed to 
claim reasonable reliance necessary to support a 
estoppel. In addition, the trial court denied Ri 
of promissory estoppel on the grounds that he did 
burden of proving the fact and amount of damages, 
appeals. 
the mortgage, 
establish the 
ng the trial 
Richards should 
The trial 
demonstrate the 
of promissory 
chards's claim 
not meet his 
Richards 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
r the trial court 
Ibetween Richards and 
under the 
flO The first question before us is whethej:
erred m determining that the relationship 
Brown terminated, and the statute of reposel 
unsolemnized marriage statute was triggered, as of the time that 
Richards moved out of Brown's home in September 2005. We review 
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. See Jeffs 
v Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1241 (Utah 1998) . We also review the 
grant of summary judgment for correctness. See ForsberQ v. Bovis 
Lend Lease, Inc. , 2008 UT App 146, % 7, 184 P.3d 610, cert 
denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008) . 
fll Richards next claims that even in the 
unsolemnized marriage, he is entitled to rel 
[absence of an 
cover his 
contributions to the mortgage under the equitable theories of 
unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, 
equitable doctrines "are mixed questions of 
Realty 86 Assocs v Security Inv., Ltd., 2 
P.3d 586. Accordingly, we defer to a trial 
findings unless there is clear error but review its legal 
conclusions for correctness. See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244. 
However, because of the fact-intensive nature of equitable 
doctrines, we grant the trial court broader! discretion m 
applying the law to the facts. See id. at 1245 (giving trial 
court broad deference when reviewing claim of unjust enrichment] 
Claims based on 
fact and law." U S. 
002 UT 14, % 11, 
court fs factual 
40 
wa 
9. (...continued) 
(discussing general rule of mootness and 
judgment has been voluntarily satisfied). 
argument because although Richards does not 
received payment, there is no satisfaction 
record. See Hollmasworth v. Farmers Ins. 
(Utah 1982) (requiring the execution of a Satisfaction 
judgment to moot a controversy). 
iver of appeal once 
|We reject Brown's 
dispute that he 
of judgment m the 
Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639 
of 
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Department of Human Servs, ex rel. Parker v. Inzarry, 94 5 P. 2d 
676, 678 (Utah 1997) (same for estoppel claim). 
Hl2 We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's 
determination that Richards failed to introduce sufficient 
evidence to establish damages, and we will not overturn the trial 
court's decision unless there was no reasonable basis for the 
decision. See Lefavi v Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, H 16, 994 P.2d 
817 ("When a reasonable basis exists for the trial court's 
[determination of] damages, this court will affirm the [trial 
court's decision] on appeal."); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, % 11, 977 P.2d 508 ("We review a court's 
decision to remit a damages award based upon insufficiency of 
evidence . . . for an abuse of discretion."). 
Kl3 Finally, Richards asserts that the trial court improperly 
granted Brown's request for a protective order, which limited his 
ability to conduct discovery. "We review a district court's 
ruling on a discovery issue for abuse of discretion." Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, % 59, 150 P.3d 480. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Unsolemnized Marriage 
Kl4 Utah law recognizes an unsolemnized marriage as a legal and 
valid marriage if a court determines that "it arises out of a 
contract between a man and a woman" who: (1) are "of legal age 
and capable of giving consent"; (2) are "legally capable of 
entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of [title 30, 
chapter 1 ] " ; (3) "have cohabited"; (4) "mutually assume rights, 
duties, and obligations" of marriage; and (5) hold themselves out 
as husband and wife and have acquired a reputation as such. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2007). However, to have the 
relationship established as a marriage, a petition for 
declaration of marriage must be filed with the district court 
during the relationship described by Utah Code section 30-1-
4.5(1) or within one year of its termination . See id. § 30-1-
4.5(2); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, % 30, 1 P.3d 1074 
(interpreting subsection (2) of section 30-1-4.5 to require "the 
filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year 
after the termination of the relationship"). 
^15 The trial court ruled that Richards's claim under section 
30-1-4.5 was barred by the running of the statute of repose. In 
reaching that decision, the trial court concluded first that the 
date the parties ceased to cohabit was undisputed and second that 
the relationship described m section 30-1-4.5 ended on that 
date. Because the petition to establish an unsolemnized marriage 
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was not filed within one year of the date idhe 
Richards moved out of Brown's home, the trijal 
partial summary judgment m favor of Brown. 
parties agree 
court granted 
A. There Are No Material Facts in Dispute As to When the Parties 
Ceased to Cohabit. 
1|l6 Relying on the Utah Supreme Court's decision m Clark v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P 3d 538, Richards challenges the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling. In Clark J the supreme court 
reaffirmed the holding of In re Marriage of Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, 
1 P. 3d 1074, that an action to establish an unsolemnized marriage 
under section 30-1-4.5 "is timely if filed within one year of the 
termination of the relationship, " even if the proceeding to have 
the unsolemnized marriage legally established is not concluded by 
that time. Clark, 2 001 UT 44, f 11. Richards contends that, in 
reaching its decision m Clark, the supreme court recognized that 
the definition of cohabitation is not as precise as the one 
employed by the trial court. Instead, Ricnards contends that the 
Clark decision acknowledges the reality of conflicts m 
relationships that may involve temporary separations. See id. 
^ 17 (relying on record evidence that established that the 
parties had a brief period of separation during which the 
partners continued to spend the night together on occasion, 
exchanged expressions of love and affection, and shared expenses, 
as evidence that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's finding of cohabitation). Thus, Richards contends 
that it was inappropriate for the trial court to conclude as a 
matter of law that cohabitation here ended at the time he moved 
out of Brown's home. Instead, Richards ass erts that he was 
entitled to put on evidence concerning wher} cohabitation between 
these parties ended. 
%11 While we agree that the date upon whidh cohabitation ceases 
may require a factual inquiry, thereby making summary judgment 
unavailable, the record reflects that there was no factual 
dispute raised by Richards on that point in the trial court. To 
the contrary, Richards concedes m his statement of facts in his 
response to the motion for partial summary judgment that "[t]he 
parties have one child together . . . and cohabited for 
approximately ten years from May 1995 until [Richards] moved out 
of [Brown's] home m approximately Septemberfl 2 0 05." (Emphases 
added ) Thus, m this case there were no material facts m 
dispute on the question of when cohabitation ended. See 
generally Giusti v Sterling Wentworth Cord) , 2009 UT 2, H 53, 
201 P 3d 966 ("When, as here, the moving party 'challenges an 
element of the nonmovmg party's case on the basis that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to 
the nonmovmg party to present evidence thgit is sufficient to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact< !" (quoting Eagar v. 
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Burrows, 2008 UT 42, ^ 15, 191 P.3d 9)). Rather than challenging 
Brown's assertion that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact m dispute, Richards conceded the facts that established 
that cohabitation had ended. 
B. The Relationship Terminates upon the Failure of One of the 
Elements of Section 30-1-4.5(1). 
il 18 Richaids further argues that the termination of one element 
required for a solemnized marriage under the unsolemnized 
marriage statute does not determine when the relationship ends. 
In support of that argument, Richards relies on the legislature's 
use of the words "termination of that relationship" m subsection 
(2) of section 30-1-4.5. According to Richards, the use of the 
word "relationship" indicates that the legislature did not intend 
for the termination of any one factor to automatically trigger 
the statute of repose. Rather, he asserts, "a fair reading and 
application of the statute is to allow a party to establish 
termination on a case-by-case basis." Richards argues that his 
position is supported by this court's statement m Hansen v. 
Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that "[n]o single 
factor is determinative" m establishing an unsolemnized 
marriage, see id. at 935. He contends that this must also mean 
that the absence of one element does not automatically terminate 
the relationship. 
'^ |l9 Richards misinterprets our opinion in Hansen. Following our 
statement that " [n]o single factor is determinative," we said, 
"Evidence cf each element is essential [to establish an 
unsolemnized marriage]." Id In so stating, we recognized that 
evidence of a single factor is not sufficient, alone, to create a 
marriage-type relationship for purposes of the unsolemnized 
marriage statute. See id. ("Although 'evidence of general 
reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital rights and 
duties would be evidence of consent,' such evidence 'standing 
alone, would not be sufficient.' 'Section 30-1-4.5 requires 
general reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital 
obligations as separate elements m addition to consent.'" 
(emphasis added) (quoting Whyte v. Blair, 885 P. 2d 791, 794 (Utah 
1994))). Consequently, the Hansen opinion does not support 
Richards's argument that an unsolemnized relationship is not 
terminated by the cessation of a single element identified by the 
legislature. 
f20 Moreover, Richards's position that the trial court may 
disregard the absence of one of the subsection (1) requirements 
is belied by the language of the statute. To have an 
unsolemnized relationship recognized as a legal and valid 
marriage, a party must file a petition with the district court 
either "during the relationship described m Subsection (1), or 
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we 
within one year following the termination o 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (2007) (emphas 
(2)!s use of the word "that" m the second 
word "relationship" references the phrase 
described m Subsection (1)," which is used 
clause. Because "the relationship described 
is one comprised of five identified factors 
conjunctive "and," see id. § 30-1-4.5(1), 
termination of an unsolemnized marriage occ 
one of the statutory factors ceases to exis 
DeLand v Uintah County, 945 P 2d 172, 174 
("We [must] assume the Legislature careful 
the statute's words and phrases ") Indeed 
conclusion m Kunz v Kunz, 2006 UT App 151 
id. f 40 (holding that the statute of repos 
the section 30-1-4.5(1) relationship ceased 
husband's legal inability to enter into a s 
f that relationship " 
(LS added) . Subsection 
lause to modify the 
|the relationship 
m the previous 
m Subsection (1)" 
and joined by the 
conclude that 
|irs_ at the time any 
See generally 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
and advisedly chose 
we reached the same 
136 P.3d 1278. See 
|s began running when 
to exist by virtue of 
blemnized marriage due 
i y 
to his intervening legal marriage to another) 
f21 Our conclusion today establishes a rul 
deadline for seeking recognition of the rel 
easily ascertained m most cases than the c 
te from which the 
ationship can be more 
ase-by-case approach 
beca 
stat 
suggested by Richards. And we are not 
approach is unfair to the participants 
limit of section 30-1-4.5(2) acts as a 
cannot be tolled. Id. K 21. Contrary 
that he had only one year m which to 
an unsolemnized marriage, either party to 
have it recognized as a legal marriage at 
relationship and for one year thereafter. 
§ 30-1-4.5(2), see also Clark v. Clark, 200 
538 (Wilkms, J., concurring in the result) 
party seeking to establish the marriage was 
opportunity to do so that began when the re 
and ended one year after the 
Thus, Richards had up to 
have had his relationship wi 
marriage, so long as all the 
convinced that such an 
partner began, 
relationship"), 
which he could 
a legal 
Use "the one-year time 
ute of repose" that 
to Richards's assertions 
establish the existence of 
the relationship may 
any point during the 
Bee Utah Code Ann. 
UT 44, % 25, 27 P.3d 
(noting that "the 
afforded an 
[Lationship with [his] 
termination of that 
eleven years during 
ph Brown recognized as 
statutory elements were 
1 
present 
C. Section 3 0-1-4.5 Does Not Require the Plarties To Be Presently 
Cohabiting. 
10. Two of the factors contain requirement 
past tense. See Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-1-4.5 
will be discussed further m part I.C., requirements expressed m 
the past tense do not technically cease and thus do not 
automatically terminate the relationship fqr purposes of 
triggering the statute of repose. 
s expressed m the 
1) (c) , (e) (2007) . As 
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|^22 Notwithstanding our conclusion that the parties did not 
cohabit after Richards moved to a new residence and that the 
extinguishment of any one factor identified in subsection (1) may 
render the relief provided by section 3 0-1-4 5 unavailable, we 
agree with Richards that partial summary judgment was improperly 
granted. 
1J23 In resolving any question concerning the interpretation of a 
statute, we begin with its plain language. See Utah Pepft of 
Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, fl 22 ("Our primary goal m 
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent 
as evidenced by the plain language in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve " (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). As discussed, the statute of repose m the 
unsolemmzed marriage act is triggered by the termination of a 
section 30-1-4.5(1) relationship, which under some circumstances 
may coincide with the extinguishment of a single element required 
by subsection (1). However, the express language of the statute 
anticipates that the element of cohabitation be treated 
differently. 
^24 The unsolemmzed marriage statute provides as follows: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized 
according to this chapter shall be legal and 
valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract 
between a man and a woman who: 
(a) are of legal age and capable of 
giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering into 
a solemnized marriage under this chapter, 
(c) have cohabited, 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, 
duties, and obligations; 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2007) (emphases added). 
1125 In listing the elements needed to create a relationship that 
may be established as a legal marriage, the legislature used 
different verb tenses for certain requirements. Compare id. 
§ 30-1-4.5(1) (a)-(b) (requiring that the partners presently be of 
legal age and capable of entering into a solemnized marriage), 
with id. § 30-1-4.5(1) (c) (requiring only that the couple have 
cohabited). We assume the legislature used these different verb 
tenses advisedly. See Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, % 21, 197 
P.3d 636 ("[W]hen examining the statutory language, we assume the 
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legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its 
ordinary meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unlike 
m Kunz v. Kunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278, where the 
husband could not meet the present tense requirement that he be 
capable of entering into a solemnized marriage, id. ^ 29, the 
parties here agree that they "have cohabited, " see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-1-4.5(1)(c). That is all that subsection (1) requires. See 
id Consequently, the date Richards moved out does not, as a 
matter of law, determine when the relationship terminated by the 
failure of one of the elements required by section 30-1-4.5(1). 
on 
nding 
%26 Instead, Richards was entitled to pre 
despite his move from the home, the secti 
relationship did not terminate until a lat 
trial court hears the evidence concerning 
required by the statute, it must make fi 
conclusions of law establishing when the r^ 
In doing so, the trial court should consid^ 
direction found in the express language of 
the petition to establish an unsolemnized 
within one year of that date, Richards is 
with his claim under section 30-1-4 5. Be 
material issues of fact m dispute on the 
relationship terminated, we reverse the tr:|. 
summary judgment decision and remand for 
(1) 
er 
ent evidenc 
30-1-4 5(  
date. Af 
tthe other el 
s of fact 
lationship 
r the legis 
subsection 
marriage was 
Entitled to 
ause there 
duestion of 
e that, 
ial court's 
farther proce 
ter the 
ements 
and 
terminated, 
lature's 
(l).11 If 
filed 
go forward 
are 
when the 
partial 
edmgs. 
II. Unjust Enrichment 
%21 Even if he cannot establish an unsoleittnized marriage, 
Richards claims he is entitled to compensation under the theory 
of unjust enrichment.12 The trial court rejected this theory, 
11. For example, the statute requires that the couple "hold 
themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife." Utah Cod^ Ann. 
(2007). The first part of this element is 
tense and joined by the conjunction "and" to the general 
reputation requirement, which is stated m | 
Therefore, to have a relationship that fal] 
unsolemnized marriage statute, the parties 
themselves out as married and must have acquired a reputation as 
such. 
30-1-4.5 (1) (e) 
stated m the present 
the past tense. 
s within the 
must presently hold 
12. We do not address Richards's constructive trust or implied 
contracts arguments because Richards abandoned these claims m 
the trial court. See State v. Holgate, 20Q0 UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 
346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal " ) . 
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concluding that Richards had not established the elements of 
unjust enrichment. We agree. 
A. Richards Must Establish the Value of Any Benefit Conferred on 
Brown to Recover Under a Theory of Unjust Enrichment. 
^28 To recover on a claim for unjust enrichment,13 Richards must 
establish three elements: 
(1) a benefit conferred on one person by 
another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by 
the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the 
acceptance or retention by the conferee of 
the benefit under such circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for the conferee to 
retain the benefit without payment of its 
value. 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Richards bears the burden of proving 
each of these elements. See id. ; see also Desert Miriah, Inc. v. 
B&L Auto, Inc , 2000 UT 83, 1 13, 12 P.3d 580 ("The plaintiff 
must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust 
enrichment."). 
|^29 ?,The first element of [unjust enrichment] requires the court 
to measure the benefit conferred on the defendant by the 
plaintiff." Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake 
County, 2007 UT 72, ^ 26, 167 P 3d 1080; see also Breitlmg Bros. 
Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., 597 P.2d 869, 872 
(Utah 1979) (remanding where trial court failed to resolve the 
essential issue of whether the defendant "ha [d] m fact been 
[benefitted] by the project carried out by plaintiff") As 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court m Emergency Physlclans 
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, 167 P.3d 1080, 
"It is not enough that a benefit was conferred on the defendant, 
rather, the enrichment to the defendant must be unjust m that 
the defendamt received a true windfall or 'something for 
nothing.'" Id. % 26 (quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and 
Implied Contracts § 13 (2001)). Furthermore, "[t]he benefit 
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or 
the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of 
recovery." Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 
13. Unjust enrichment is also known as contract implied m law 
and is one branch of the doctrine of quantum meruit. See 
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2 0 0 7 UT 
72, |^ 10, 167 P. 3d 1080. The second branch of quantum meruit is 
contract implied m fact. See id. 
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2006 UT App 331, H 36, 153 P. 3d 714 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) . But see Emergency Physicians, 2007 UT 72, ^ 29 
(holding that where the benefit is in the form of services, "the 
measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the 
reasonable value of the services rendered11 )| . 
H3 0 Thus, to prevail on his unjust enrichment claim, Richards 
was required to establish that a benefit was conferred on Brown 
and that it would be unjust for her to retain that benefit 
without paying for it. The trial court concluded that Richards 
"failed to carry his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that any portion of the $71,100 in payments he made to 
[Brown] unjustly enriched her to his detriment." Richards 
challenges that ruling on appeal, claiming that "unjust 
enrichment analysis supports an award of equity accumulated over 
ten years or reimbursement of the $71,100."! (Emphasis omitted.) 
We now discuss each of these theories. 
B. Richards Is Not Entitled to Reimbursement of the $71,100. 
K31 We first consider Richards's position that the entire 
$71,100 he paid to Brown during the ten yedrs he lived in her 
home constitutes the amount it would be inequitable for her to 
retain. As the trial court recognized, Riqhards received 
something in return for those payments--a place to live. See 
id. 1f 2 6 (stating that a claim of unjust enrichment requires that 
the defendant receive "a true windfall or something for nothing" 
(internal quotation marks omitted) ) . If Richards had not lived 
with Brown, he would have incurred living expenses elsewhere. 
Upon review of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded 
that the amount Richards would have paid in rent over ten years 
was roughly equal to what he paid to Brown. Consequently, the 
trial court concluded that Brown was not unjustly enriched as a 
result of those monthly payments because she provided Richards 
with a place to live. See Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 
1265, 1269-70 (Colo. 2000) (affirming the appellate court's 
remand for the offset of any unjust enrichment to unmarried owner 
of home by the reasonable rental value former partner received 
while residing in the house). 
|^32 Our review of the record reveals two po 
evidence on this point. First, Brown charged 
month in rent prior to 1995 to reside in the 
she subsequently shared with Richards. Sec 
$750 per month in rent in 2 0 08 for a home A 
neighborhood that is roughly two thirds the 
house. There was no direct evidence offers 
rental value of Brown's home at any point 
issue. Consequently, the trial court compared 
paid to rent Brown's basement prior to 199 
ssible sources of 
a tenant $3 0 0 per 
basement of the home 
ond, Richards paid 
n the same 
size of Brown's 
d as to the actual 
ing the ten years at 
the $3 0 0 per month 
and the $7 5 0 per 
dur 
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month Richards paid in 2008 for a smaller home, with Richards's 
payments to Brown, which increased from $400 m 1995 to $650 by 
2003 
|^3 3 The record reflects that Richards began residing with Brown 
m May 1995 and relocated m September 2005--a period of 125 
months Thus, Richards paid an average of approximately $569 per 
month during that time. Where there was no more precise evidence 
m the record, we defer to the trial court's finding that "the 
amounts [Richards] contributed monthly [we]re m line with what 
his rental costs would have been if he had rented a house or 
apartment somewhere close-by to where his daughter was living." 
On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court 
exceeded its broad discretion m finding the amounts paid to 
Brown roughly equal to the rental value of the home the parties 
shared. See generally Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244-45 
(Utah 1998) (recognizing the fact-intensive nature of equitable 
doctrines and granting the trial court broad discretion). 
C. The Evidence m the Record Is Insufficient to Determine the 
Amount of Any Benefit to Brown m the Form of Increased Equity. 
1)34 Alternatively, Richards argues that Brown was unjustly 
enriched because while he paid half the mortgage, Brown retained 
all of the equity. He further contends that the value of that 
benefit is equal to half the equity earned during his time living 
with Brown Richards bears the burden of establishing both the 
fact that equity was earned during the relevant time period and 
the value of any unjust enrichment to Brown. See Desert Miriah, 
Inc v. B&L Auto, Inc , 2000 UT 83, f 13, 12 P 3d 580 (requiring 
that the plaintiff prove each element of unjust enrichment). 
]^3 5 Our review of the record reveals no evidence as to the 
amount of equity m the home m May 19 95, when Richards began 
cohabiting with Brown, or m September 2 0 05, when he moved. 
Indeed, the^  only appraisal entered into evidence was obtained m 
March 2008, two and one-half years after Richards moved out of 
Brown's home. Although that appraisal concluded that the home 
was worth $425,000, it provides no information about what the 
value of the home was m 1995 and 2005--the dates needed for the 
calculation of the change m equity during the relevant period. 
^36 Richards argues that this gap m the evidence can be filled 
by extrapolating from the 2008 appraisal He asserts that his 
equity interest can be calculated by multiplying the 2008 equity 
by 0.66 and then dividing that number m half. According to 
Richards, the 0.66 represents the proportion of Brown's total 
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ownership during which he resided in the hokie 
calculation, Richards asserts that he is enb 
m damages.15 There are several problems wi 
Under this 
ltled to over $91,000 
th this approach. 
%37 First, even if we were to 
would reject his 0 66 figure, 
for fifteen years when Richards 
it at the time the 2008 apprais 
ten-year occupancy would need t 
years Brown owned the property 
relevant to the equity existing 
Richards lived m the home with 
owned it as of the time of the 
Richards adopt 
Although Bro 
relocated, 
al was 
o be comparejd 
to calculate 
m 2008 
Brown for 5 
2008 apprais 
prepared 
Ub 
s methodology, we 
tan had owned the home 
phe continued to own 
Thus, Richards's 
to the eighteen 
a percentage that is 
m g those numbers, 
E>% of the time Brown 
]^3 8 Furthermore, Richards' s analysis relie 
that equity rises at a constant rate that 
However, home equity is not susceptible to 
calculation The equity m a home is direc 
home's value at any given time. Home value 
nor do they always increase. Consequently, 
the increase or decrease m equity must be 
specific time period at issue. Brown owned 
and-a-half years prior to and two-and-half 
co-occupancy, during which time the value o 
rapidly appreciated. Where the evidence ne 
any actual change m equity was absent fromj 
court was not required to adopt Richards's 
straight-line appreciation. Cf. Haupt v H 
K 14, 131 P.3d 252 (affirming trial court's 
using straight-line method of calculation 
damages was the difference between the pric 
of purchase and the price of the stock on 
is on the assumption 
never falls or varies. 
a straight-line 
ply related to the 
B are not stagnant, 
the calculation of 
pailored to the 
the house for five-
years after Richards's 
f the home could have 
pessary to quantify 
the record, the trial 
Assumption of 
aps, 2005 UT App 436, 
exclusion of exhibit 
where proper measure of 
e of the stock on date 
dkte of sale). 
i|3 9 In addition, Richards assumes that he 
mortgage for the entire ten years he cohabi 
evidence does not support this assumption 
paid $4 00 toward Brown's $1187 monthly 
equates to 34% of the mortgage. Even after! 
jpaid 50% of the 
.[bed with Brown. The 
In 1995, Richards 
payment. This 
Richards raised his 
monthly payment to $550, Brown's mortgage obligation was $1500. 
mortbage 
14. Richards claims that Brown owned the home for fifteen years 
and he resided m her home for ten years, 
equals approximately 0 66 
Ten divided by fifteen 
15. The 2 0 08 equity m Brown's home was $2| 
claims the 1995 to 2005 equity 
$277,000 by 0.66, which equals 
believes he is entitled to half the equity, 
by two to calculate his share as $91,410. 
77,000. Richards 
can be calculated by multiplying 
$182,820 because Richards 
he divided $182,820 
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Thus, for that period, Richards made a 37% contribution to the 
mortgage. In 2 003, Brown's mortgage payment was $1516 and 
Richards was paying her $650. At that time, Richards was paying 
Brown 43% of the monthly mortgage obligation While we 
acknowledge that the amount of the mortgage fluctuated m part 
due to Brown's refinancing transactions, the record contained no 
formula to determine the amount of any unjust enrichment. 
%40 Richards argues that the evidence is good enough for a claim 
m equity. While we agree with Richards that " [ujnjust 
enrichment must remain a flexible and workable doctrine," Jeffs 
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998), that flexibility does 
not excuse the plaintiff from establishing that, m fact, the 
defendant has been unjustly enriched m some calculable amount. 
For example, m Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), the supreme court 
affirmed tiie trial court's verdict of no cause of action where 
the plaintiff failed to quantify its damages. See id. at 1044, 
1052. The plaintiff had attempted to rely on a total costs 
theory of damages, arguing that it was entitled to its total 
expenditures on a construction 30b minus the amounts already 
received. See id. The trial court refused to admit the total 
costs evidence because it was not tied to any specific wrongful 
conduct of the defendants and the plaintiff provided no other 
evidence of damages at trial. See id. at 1045. Consequently, 
the trial court ruled against the plaintiff due to a failure of 
proof on damages. See id. 
1(41 On appeal, the Highland Construction plaintiff argued that 
the damages should have been adequate for its causes of action, 
including a claim for quantum meruit . See id. The supreme court 
rejected this argument, stating, 
It is true that some degree of uncertainty m 
the evidence of damages will not relieve a 
defendant from recompensing a wronged 
plaintiff. However, it is also a general 
rule of long standing that a plaintiff must 
show damages by evidence of facts and not by 
mere conclusions, and that the items of 
damage must be established by substantial 
evidence and not by conjecture. 
Id. (citations omitted). On the face of this record, the trial 
court did not exceed its discretion m refusing to quantify the 
benefit to Brown without substantial evidence. 
1(42 Nor are we convinced that the decisions from other 
jurisdictions upon which Richards relies hold otherwise. In 
Tolan v. Kimball, 33 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2001) (per curiam), the 
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Alaska Supreme Court, applying its standards for cohabiting 
couples, enforced the intent of the parties to share the equity 
in their residence equally. See id. at 1154-55. The court was 
able to determine the amount of that award, however, because 
there was evidence in the record that during the period of 
cohabitation, "the property's [net] value increased from $66,000 
to $168,000." Id. at 1153; see also Ulrich v. Zemke, 2002 WI App 
246, %<{ 4-6, 10, 258 Wis. 2d 180, ff 4-6, 10, 654 N.W.2d 458, 
%% 4-6, 10 (approving use of unjust enrichment theory to assess 
the rights of a formerly cohabiting couple where the record 
contained specific values for the various properties at issue 
during the relevant time period). 
1(43 Richards also relies on Salzman v. Bacfirach, 996 P. 2d 1263 
(Colo 2 000), wherein the Colorado Supreme 
fact of cohabitation does not bar a suit inl 
1269. In reaching that conclusion, the Salpman court cautioned, 
Court held that the 
equity. See id. at 
[C]ohabitation and sexual relations alone do 
not suspend contract and equity principles. 
We do caution, however, that mere 
cohabitation does not trigger any marital 
rights. A court should not declihe to 
provide relief to parties in dispute merely 
because their dispute arose in relationship 
to cohabitation. Rather, the court should 
determine, as with any other parties, whether 
general contract laws and equitable rules 
apply. 
Id. at 1268-69 (footnote omitted) ; see also Flood v. Kalinyaprak, 
2004 MT 15, %\ 20-21, 319 Mont. 280, %% 20-il, 84 P.3d 27, %\ 20-
21 (rejecting divorce analysis and using partition action to 
divide property owned as tenants in common by unmarried former 
cohabitants) . We see nothing in the cases cited by Richards that 
would have required the trial court to accept the damage theory 
advanced simply because Richards asserted equitable claims.16 
D. Brown Was Not Unjustly Enriched by Richards's Contributions 
to Routine Maintenance. 
f44 Richards also argues that Brown was unjj 
contributions to home maintenance during tht 
We disagree. The maintenance expenses did 
justly enriched by his 
time they cohabited. 
hot materially benefit 
16. Because we hold that the trial court did not exceed its 
discretion in finding that Richards did not quantify the value of 
any benefit to Brown, we need not address tfie other elements of 
unjust enrichment. 
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Brown by enhancing the overall value of the home. See Emergency 
Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, ^ 26, 
167 P 3d ]080 (noting that unjust enrichment requires that a 
defendant receive more than an incidental benefit). Furthermore, 
while maintenance was part of the necessary expense of occupying 
the home, the improvements paid for by Richards added to its 
future value. See generally Bettmger v Bettmger, 793 P. 2d 
389, 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (defining improvements as those 
that nadd to the value of or enhance the marketability of the 
home" and maintenance as activities that are necessary for 
maintaining a home but do not enhance its overall value) . Thus, 
Brown and Richards shared equally m the benefit from the 
maintenance expenses while living together m the home. In 
contrast, Brown continues to enjoy a benefit from the 
improvements long after Richards vacated the premises. We agree 
with the trial court that Brown has been unjustly enriched by the 
improvements but not by the routine maintenance expenses. 
III. Promissory Estoppel 
%45 Richards argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
also entitles him to an interest m the home equity. Promissory 
estoppel is "employed where injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise." Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, 
f 22, 163 P 3d 747. To make a claim of promissory estoppel, 
proof of four elements must be shown-
(1) [Richards] acted with prudence and m 
reasonable reliance on a promise made by 
[Brown]; (2) [Brown] knew that [Richards] 
relied on the promise which [Brown] should 
reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of [Richards] . . . ; 
(3) [Brown] was aware of all material facts; 
and (4) [Richards] relied on the promise and 
the reliance resulted m a loss to [him]. 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, % 16, 158 P.3d 
1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[^4 6 The trial court found that Brown, with knowledge of all 
material facts, made a promise to Richards to "treat him 
equitably," "that is, he would get an interest m his 
contribution to the home." However, the trial court concluded 
that Richards failed to meet his burden m proving the other two 
elements. First, the court said, "[Richards] has not shown he 
acted with prudence and m reasonable reliance . . . [on Brown's] 
promise [to add Richards to the title]" because Brown had twice 
refinanced the home without adding Richards's name to the title 
and Richards had never taken serious initiative to have his name 
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added. The trial court further concluded tlhat even if Richards 
had reasonably relied, he did not show any 
of that reliance, 
appeal. 
Richards challenges both conclusions on 
detriment as a result 
1|47 Even if we were to assume that Richardls! s reliance on 
Brown's promise was reasonable, he still mupt prove damages to 
prevail on a claim of promissory estoppel 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct, 
See Andreason v. 
App. 1993) 
fel] requires that a ("An award of damages [on promissory estoppt 
plaintiff prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the 
evidence . . . .") . "Damages in promissory estoppel are limited 
to those which are sustained because the plaintiff [] ha [s] 
changed [his] position to [his] detriment in reasonable reliance 
upon the defendant's representation." Id. at 175. Generally, a 
promise binding under promissory estoppel is enforced by awarding 
the plaintiff his expectation damages. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 90 cmt. d (1981) (n[F]ull scale enforcement by 
normal [contract] remedies is often appropriate."); id. § 347 
(stating that the general measure of damages for breach of 
contract is the expectation interest); see also Alta Health 
Stratecfies, Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv. , 930 P.id 280, 284-85 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) ("According to Utah contract law, . . . damages 
[for breach] are properly measured by the amount necessary to 
'place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the 
contract had been performed.'" (citation omitted)). Sometimes, 
the more equitable remedy under a theory of promissory estoppel 
is reliance damages, or damages to return the plaintiff to the 
position the plaintiff enjoyed before relying on the promise. 
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d & illustrations 
(1981) . The correct measure of damages in a particular case is a 
question of law. See Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, f 23, 7 P.3d 
783. Accordingly, we consider whether Richards proved his 
damages under both the expectation and reliance measures. 
A. The Record Does Not Support an Award of Expectation Damages. 
1J48 If damages were calculated based on Ri< 
he would be entitled to the value of the pre 
fair interest in the equity. Due to the eqi 
promissory estoppel, the calculation of dama 
flexible than in typical contract cases. Sj 
at 175-76, 178 (requiring damages to be bas< 
calculation"). 
hards's expectation, 
imise made, that is, a 
itable nature of 
ges may be more 
e. Andrea son, 848 P.2d 
d on a "case by case 
[^4 9 Despite the inherent flexibility in prqmi 
cases, damages still must be proved "with re 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (198 
damages need not be established "with precis 
King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), but, at] 
ssory estoppel 
asonable certainty." 
1) . The amount of 
ion," Bastian v. 
a minimum, 
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 [Richards must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of 
the evidence and the amount of damages by approximations and 
projections that rise above mere speculation," Andreason, 848 
P.2d at 176; accord 11 Corbm on Contracts § 56.16 (2005) ("In 
order to be entitled to . damages , the plaintiff must 
lay a basis for a reasonable estimate of the extent of harm 
caused by the breach."). 
1(50 A brief review of the case law demonstrates this 
distinction. In Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 
P. 2d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), for example, the court upheld an 
award of damages on the plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim. 
See id at 178 There, the plaintiffs sued their insurance 
company for failing to pay for repairs that the insurance company 
had instructed them to make See id. at 173-74. At trial, the 
plaintiffs presented detailed evidence of the amount of damages 
by "meticulously testif[ying] from . . personal written records 
of expenses," which detailed the costs associated with the 
specific items that, as instructed, the plaintiffs discarded and 
replaced rather than repaired. Id. at 176. This court held that 
the plaintiffs introduced "sufficient evidence to allow the 
[fact-finder] to determine an entitlement to promissory estoppel 
damages and to calculate their value." Id. (emphasis added). 
f51 On the other hand, m A t k m Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co , 709 P 2d 330 (Utah 1985) , the 
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing the amount of 
damages where he only provided information on his business's lost 
gross income instead of its lost net income See id. at 336. 
The supreme court held that " [p]roof of loss of gross income only 
is an insufficient foundation for proof of amount of damages" and 
that, while the gross figures may have proven the fact that 
damages existed, the net income figures were necessary for the 
court to approximate the actual amount of damages. See id. 
f52 Here, as noted earlier, Richards introduced evidence as to 
the market value and equity that existed in the home in 2008, but 
the record contained no evidence of the equity at the time he 
moved into the home m 1995 or when he moved out m 2 005. 
Without those parameters, it is impossible to determine the 
equity earned during the years Richards contributed to the 
mortgage. Even if the 2008 estimate of the home's value and 
equity had been sufficient to prove that damages actually 
occurred, it does not establish an appropriate measure of the 
amount of damages. See id At best, the 2 00 8 estimate gave the 
trial court a gross value from which to begin. See id. But, as 
previously discussed, home values do not appreciate on a straight 
line, and they may even decrease. Therefore, without any 
evidence of the change in home equity from 1995 to 2005, the 
trial court lacked the net value it needed to approximate or 
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calculate the amount of Richards's damages.. Without that 
evidence, we cannot hold that the trial court exceeded its 
discretion in concluding that Richards did not establish the 
amount of expectation damages to which he would have been 
entitled. 
B. The Record Does Not Support an Award of| Reliance Damages. 
5153 Alternatively, if Richards were entitled to reliance 
damages, he would receive compensation suff 
to the same position he would be in had he 
Brown's promise. See Restatement (Second) 
icient to return him 
hot relied upon 
|of Contracts §§ 344, 
349 (1981) . Damages would be limited to the amount Richards 
expended in reliance on Brown's promise, le 
Richards would have avoided if Brown had fully performed her 
promise. 
Co., 848 
See 
P.2d 
id. 
171, 
349 
176 
promissory estoppel are 
because the plaintiff[] 
detriment in reasonable 
representation."). In other 
equal the difference between 
what he would have paid 
above, the trial court 
property and the home 
see also Andreason 
Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
limited to those 
ha[s] changed [his] 
reliance upon the dl 
words, Ri chardp 
what he paid on 
to live somewhere e 
compared the rental 
Richards rented after 
cohabiting and concluded that the amount Ri 
in rent over ten years was roughly equal to 
Brown. 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
("Damages in 
wh|ich are sustained 
position to [his] 
|ef endant' s 
s compensation would 
Brown's mortgage and 
fLse. As discussed 
Value of Brown's 
the parties ceased 
hards would have paid 
what he paid to 
1(54 Richards maintains that he is nevertheless entitled to any 
equity he would have earned had he used the $71,100 to purchase 
his own home instead of paying Brown. Richards might be entitled 
to that equity under a reliance theory upon an appropriate 
record. However, as the trial court held, Richards failed to 
meet his burden of providing the court with evidence sufficient 
to calculate how much that equity might be. There is no evidence 
in the record showing the value of any home Richards could 
purchase; what the total amount of that mortgage would be; what 
the interest rate, monthly payments, and other terms of such a 
mortgage would be; or any other facts that would show how much 
equity Richards could have earned under his own mortgage.17 As a 
result, the trial court lacked any figures that would have 
allowed it to approximate his reliance damages based on how much 
his hypothetical equity might be. See generally Andreason, 848 
P. 2d at 176 (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of showing 
17. The trial court would also have to asstime that Richards 
would have actually purchased his own home jlf he had not relied 
on Brown's promise. 
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"the amount of damages by approximations and projections that 
rise above mere speculation") Therefore, the trial court did 
not exceed its discretion in holding that Richards did not meet 
his burden of establishing his reliance damages Thus, because 
Richards failed to prove either expectation or reliance damages, 
we agree with the trial court that he did not establish a claim 
of promissory estoppel 18 
IV Protective Order 
1|55 Richards' s final argument is that the trial court exceeded 
its discretion in granting the protective order that limited his 
ability to conduct discovery The trial court granted the 
protective order for two reasons. First, "the discovery was 
propounded m violation of Utah [Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(d)." 
Rule 26(d) prohibits a party from "seek[mg] discovery . . . 
before the parties have met and conferred as required by [Rule 
26(f)]." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d). Under rule 26(f), Richards's 
counsel was responsible for scheduling the meeting. See id. R. 
26 (f) . At the time Richards served Brown with his discovery 
requests, his counsel had neither met with Brown's counsel nor 
scheduled such a meeting. Further, even after the court's 
express directive to Richards's counsel to submit a scheduling 
order, counsel never did so. 
^56 Second, the trial court noted that trial was less than two 
weeks away and that Richards had submitted a Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial one year earlier In this certificate, 
Richards's counsel stated, "Counsel has completed all discovery." 
Cf. McNair v Farns, 944 P.2d 392, 396 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(refusing to consider the plaintiff's argument that he could 
survive summary judgment had the trial court allowed him more 
time to conduct discovery when the plaintiff had previously 
filed two certificates indicating that all discovery was 
complete). Under the facts of this case, we decline to conclude 
that the trial court exceeded its discretion m granting the 
protective order.19 Accordingly, we affirm on this issue. 
18. Because we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Richards 
failed to prove damages, we need not consider whether he 
reasonably relied on Brown's promise. 
19. Nothing in this opinion, however, should be interpreted to 
limit the trial court's discretion m allowing additional 
discovery on the unsolemnized marriage claim, if it determines 
such discovery is appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
f57 An unsolemnized marriage requires thatt each of the five 
statutory elements be present. The plain language of the statute 
requires only that the couple have cohabited at some time. 
Consequently, termination of the section 30-1-4.5 relationship 
here may not have been coextensive with the date Richards moved 
out of Brown's home. Because there are material, disputed facts 
section 30-1-4.5 relationship terminated that must 
determine whether Richards's claim is barred by 
repose, we reverse the trial) court's entry of 
1s equitable 
of Brown 
Finally, we 
as to when the 
be resolved to 
the statute of 
partial summary judgment. With respect to iRichards 
claims, we affirm the trial court's ruling in favor 
because the record is inadequate to prove qamages 
affirm the entry of the protective order, 
6 TfctfaJL 
Caroly: McHugh, Judge(^} 
H58 WE CONCUR: 
ILirt^ t^ L /. ^^tXXf^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
William Af Thorne JrT'T JuHc^ 77 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA^E OF UTAH 
STEVE RICHARDS, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, : CAS? NO. 064906011 
vs. 
DIANA BROWN, 
Respondent. 
Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation re: grant 
of Partial Summary Judgment on common law marriage claim is overruled. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the parties' briefing on 
respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment], petitioner's Objection 
to the Commissioner's Recommendation, and respondent's Response. The 
Court has also reviewed the case law defining cohabitation in various 
contexts. 
In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah |l985) , the Utah Supreme 
Court defined the term "cohabitation" to include two key elements: common 
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. The 
Haddow case arose in the context of an ex-husbanfci' s request to terminate 
alimony payments after his former spouse had allegedly "cohabited" with 
another man. The appellate court determined that although this new 
boyfriend spent substantial amounts of time in *j:he woman's home, it was 
not his principal residence. Therefore, the Couft held that "the common 
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residency element of cohabitation ha[d] not been established." Ld. at 
674. 
Although Haddow arose m the alimony termination context, the 
Supreme Court applied the Haddow elements m evaluating whether a 
polygamist was cohabiting with one or more women. See, State v. Green, 
2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820. In that case the trial court had determined 
that Mr. Green had entered into a common-law marriage under Utah Code 
Ann., § 30-1-4.5, with one of the women with whom he cohabited. While 
State v. Gieen, is not squarely on point with this case, the Supreme 
Court's discussion of Haddow m that context persuades the Court that the 
residency prong is an essential element m evaluating the point at which 
the asserted common law relationship terminated. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the sexual contact between the 
parties terminated m 2001, and that the parties physically separated in 
September 2005 when petitioner moved out of the residence. Petitioner 
did not assert his common law marriage claim until December 200j» when he 
filed his Petition to establish paternity and related matters. Under In 
re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P. 3d 1074, a plurality of the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that Utah Code Ann., § 30-1-4.5 required the 
filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year after 
the termination of the relationship. Because the latest possible date 
under which the parties could have been said to have cohabited ended m 
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September 2005 when petitioner moved out, tha|t marked the point from 
which the Petition needed to have been brought. 
The Court agrees with the Commissioner that, as a matter of law, the 
Petition was untimely m that it was brought a[fter the one year period 
from the termination of the common law marriage relationship. Therefore, 
the Commissioner's Recommendation is affirmed; Objection is overruled. 
Dated this ft day of January, 2008. 
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OF LAW AND ORDER - JULY 9, 2008 
Third Judicial District 
JUL - 9 2008 
ME COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
STEVE RICHARDS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DIANA BROWN, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS pF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and ORDER 
Case no. 064906011 
Judge Denis^ Posse Lindberg 
The Court conducted a bench trial in this case on June 16^  2008. Petitioner Steve 
Richards was present and represented by his counsel, Suzanne Iv^arelius. Respondent Diana 
Brown was present and represented by her counsel, Tineke E. V^n Dijk. The Court received the 
testimony of the parties and the trial exhibits submitted by stipulation. Having considered all the 
evidence the Court now enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. These parties never married, but began living together in [1995, a daughter, Stephanie, 
was born March 29, 1996. 
2. During their ten years together, the parties resided in a hcjuse that was owned by 
Respondent and which she had received as part of a divorce settlement from her former spouse. 
Respondent had purchased the property on 12th Avenue in Salt Uake City with her then-husband 
Erik Priest on or about December 1989. Respondent and Mr. Prfest divorced in September 1991. 
On or about that time (and in connection with Respondent's divorce from Mr. Priest), the parties 
asked a mortgage company "figure out" their equity in the hous^. Respondent and Mr. Priest 
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relied upon the mortgage company's assessment of their equity as the basis for their property 
settlement; they did not have the home independently appraised. Based on the figures developed 
by the mortgage company, Respondent "paid-off Mr. Priest's equity interest in the home. 
3. The parties separated in August 2005 when Petitioner moved out. Petitioner rented a 
residence six blocks away from Respondent's home in order to be close enough to help care for 
Stephanie. Petitioner pays $750 per month for his present residence, which he shares with his 
now-fiancee. 
4. Shortly after the parties separated in 2005 they went to mediation with Marcie Keck to 
address the custody issues; those issues were folly resolved in mediation. Petitioner testified 
credibly that he did not immediately file his Petition because he was expecting that the parties 
would engage in additional mediation with a view towards resolution or reconciliation.1 As;a 
result of this delay the Petition was not filed until December 21, 2006, more than a year after 
Petitioner had moved out of the residence. 
5. Petitioner's "Verified Petition for paternity and related matters" stated three claims for 
relief: 
(a) a declaration of his paternity over the parties' minor child, Stephanie and for joint 
legal and physical custody arrangement; 
(b) declaration of a common law marriage; and 
Petitioner testified (without contrary testimony from Respondent), that the parties had 
anticipated going back to mediation to resolve their property dispute. However, Petitioner 
testified that Respondent "backed ouf'of the second round of mediation. 
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(c) equitable division of property in which parties reside4 based on partnership, implied 
contract for services, and/or constructive trust. 
6. Respondent, Ms. Brown, agreed with paternity and joint fegal/physical custody, but 
denied the common law marriage claim alleging it was untimely^ she also argued that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to determine a contract basis for apportionment of equity related to home 
unless it pertained to paternity or some form of divorce action. 
7. By stipulation of the parties, Temporary Orders entered ijm this case established Petitioner 
as the legal parent of Stephanie, and awarded the parties joint le^al/physical custody. The 
Temporary Orders adjudicated all child related issues between tlie parties, but reserved for trial 
Petitioner's claim for equitable division of property. 
8. Thereafter, Respondent brought a motion for partial suminary judgment asking the Court 
to declare that the parties did not have a common law marriage. ]The Commissioner agreed and 
recommended that summary judgment be granted and the claim dismissed. Petitioner objected; 
the Court affirmed the Commissioner's recommendation. At th^t point, only Petitioner's 
equitable division claim remained to be adjudicated. The Commissioner certified that issue for 
trial. 
9. The parties are both trained as nurses, although Petitionef no longer works in that 
capacity.2 The parties met when they while working as nurses ^t Primary Children's Medical 
Center. Respondent was married at time and testified they were |friends. Eventually she divorced 
Petitioner subsequently became employed as a clinical software consultant with 
Intermountain Health Care. 
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at or about the time Petitioner moved out of the area; when Petitioner moved back to Salt Lake 
City some years later, they moved in together. The parties had relatively comparable levels of 
earnings. 
10. Although the parties shared living expenses, they never combined their bank accounts. 
Instead, Respondent kept detailed written twice-monthly tallies of expenditures incurred (e.g., 
food, utilities, insurance, house security, cable, Stephanie's expenses, birthday gifts, etc). See Ex. 
11-A. The expenditure tallies also included household maintenance expenses (e.g., lawn 
maintenance, appliance repair, etc). The parties' practice was that twice a month Respondent 
would present these hand-written tallies to Petitioner and he would then pay Respondent, for one-
half of those costs.3 Petitioner testified, without challenge by Respondent, that whatever costs 
she identified in the twice-monthly tally sheets, he "paid without question." 
11. Both parties testified that the tallies were not exhaustive-that is, there were some 
purchases or other expenditures that were not included in the twice monthly tallies-but the 
parties either shared those costs equally or would alternate paying those expenses so as to 
equalize between them the costs involved in maintaining their family lifestyle. For example, 
Petitioner's unchallenged testimony was that he contributed significant funds to major and minor 
3Because it is her practice to purge her records on a regular basis, Respondent no longer 
has record of all of the twice-monthly expense tally sheets that she maintained during the course 
of their 10 year relationship. That said, Respondent admits that she prepared the tally sheets 
twice monthly and that they would regularly meet to reconcile accounts. Respondent does not 
contest Petitioner's assertions as to the pattern and practice of their money management 
throughout the relationship. Respondent further agrees that the tally sheets produced as exhibits 
at trial were representative of, and consistent with, those presented to the Court at trial. 
-4-
house improvements such as a new replacement deck for which petitioner paid $8895.00,4 
$312.00 towards a lawn sprinkler system, and $179.00 for the purchase and installation of a new 
ceiling fan. 
12. In addition to the above stated sharing of expenses, the uikdisputed evidence is that from 
the time he moved in, Petitioner also voluntarily gave Respondeat money towards the monthly 
mortgage expense. When he first moved in, he paid $400 per m0nth towards the mortgage. 
When Stephanie was born, Petitioner on his own increased his contribution to $550 per month. 
Later, when he got a raise, he again voluntarily increased the monthly payment to $650. On 
some occasions Petitioner would write his check directly to Countrywide, Respondent's 
mortgage company; other times he would simply write out the chfcck directly to Respondent, at or 
about the time he also paid his one-half share of the other living Expenses (per the tally sheets). 
13. Although he acknowledged that his monthly "house" payments were less than half of the 
monthly mortgage obligation, Petitioner testified that he was making "other contributions" to 
equalize the family's expenses.5 At trial, Respondent admitted tl^ at Petitioner's financial 
Respondent testified that she had paid for one half of the deck costs, but could produce 
no evidence to support her claim. In contrast, Petitioner has documentary evidence of nearly 
$9,000 he paid for the deck, and his testimony that this represented payment in full for the deck. 
The Court gives no credence to Respondent's testimony on this issue. According to Respondent, 
she "didn't know" whether the new deck added any value to the house. While it is true that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the exact amount of value that the new deck added 
to the home, there is more than adequate evidence to establish Respondent's financial 
contribution to home improvements (as contrasted with home maintenance) in considering 
Petitioner's equitable claims. 
5For example, Petitioner brought a car to the relationship, knd his vehicle (which he 
maintained and insured without financial contribution by Respondent) was used for shopping, to 
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contribution to the home and family was equal to her own. 
14. At trial Respondent argued that Petitioner's monthly payments towards the mortgage was 
nothing more than "rent" from a "tenant." Nevertheless, she admitted that at no time did she ask 
Petitioner for nor did she negotiate a specific housing payment with him. She admitted that she 
never presented Respondent with a rental agreement and she never declared the moneys she 
received from him in her taxes as "rental income." Respondent also admitted that at no time 
during their 10 years of co-habitation did she ever refer to Petitioner as her "tenant" or to the 
money she was receiving from him monthly as "rent." On the contrary, the undisputed evidence 
at trial was that throughout their time together Petitioner and Respondent viewed themselves as a 
"family" and presented themselves to their co-workers and associates as "husband" and "wife," 
even after their intimate relationship had terminated.6 See, e.g., Ex. 7, Ex. 8. 
15. At the time Petitioner moved in with Respondent, Respondent's monthly mortgage 
payment was $1187.00 per month. That amount increased to $1197.00 per month in January 
take family outings, and to transport Stephanie to various activities. Petitioner did all the driving 
because Respondent did not own a car nor had a drivers' license during their relationship. 
Petitioner acknowledged that Respondent's primary means of transportation did not involve his 
vehicle; rather, she used a bus pass, taxis, etc. Although Petitioner conceded that Respondent 
"almost exclusively used the bus to get to work" (while he drove to work), he nevertheless 
maintains he provided the "family transportation" and should now be credited for that financial 
contribution. The Court finds that while Petitioner provided a general benefit to the family when 
he used his car to transport Stephanie to an event, or the family on an outing, the substantial 
majority of expenses he incurred to maintain the vehicle were expenses that he would have 
incurred whether or not the parties had co-habited. 
6For example, Respondent remained as a beneficiary in at least some of Petitioner's 
retirement accounts (along with their daughter, Stephanie). 
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1997; increased again in January 1998 to $1226.00, then adjuste4 down to $1180. In October 
1998; again adjusted downward in November 1999 to $1173.00. (Respondent refinanced the 
property in Jan. 2001, paying off the one mortgage balance of $ 1 \ 8,871.71. Ex. 9-B. It appears 
that as part of the refinancing Respondent took $40,128.29 in equity out of the property, because 
the new mortgage was for $159,000, with monthly payments of $|1468.88. In May 2002, the 
monthly mortgage payment increased to $1497.00; it increased a^ain in March 2003 to $1516.13. 
That mortgage was paid-off in June 2004 in the amount of $148,(()45.67 when Respondent again 
refinanced her home. As with the prior refinancing, the new mortgage of approximately 
$172,900 exceeded the pay-off amount by approximately $25,000.7 Ex. 9-A. Based on this 
evidence it appears that Respondent again took money out of the Equity accrued in the home. 
There is no evidence that Petitioner shared in those equity withdrawals. 
16. Petitioner testified that there were "several times" during their life together when he "felt 
insecure about [his] financial position and [his] position in the fajjnily".8 According to Petitioner, 
Respondent had "recognized my insecurity" and had referenced h^w she had treated her ex-
husband fairly and paid him when he moved out. According to Petitioner, Respondent told him 
that if they ever split, he [Petitioner] would be treated the same-tljiat is, he would get an interest 
in his contribution to the home. Based on those representations Petitioner believed he and 
7Based on trial ex. 9-A, it appears that as of April 14, 200$, the outstanding balance on 
this latest mortgage (with Citicorp Trust Bank) is $148,909.66. 
8The parties began discussing having Petitioner's name on| the title of the house 
approximately 6 months after Stephanie was born. 
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Respondent had an agreement that in the event of a split he would get "at least partial equity" in 
the home, based on his contributions. He testified that he considered the twice monthly tally-
sheet accountings to be the parties' record of his contributions and interest in the home. For her 
part, Respondent testified that the twice-monthly accounting sheets were "not to show 
[Petitioner's] payments towards equity in the home," but rather, to respond to Petitioner's request 
for clarification as to "where the money was going" monthly. 
17. Respondent acknowledged at trial to having made statements over the years (a) that 
referenced how she had dealt with her ex-husband, (b) that she would treat Petitioner equitably, 
and (c) that she would be willing to put Petitioner on the title to the house, she testified that those 
statements were always subject to having Petitioner first pay her for one-half of her equity in the 
home. Petitioner disputed Respondent's testimony, saying he had "no recollection" of there being 
a pre-condition that he pay Respondent one half of the equity in the house before his name could 
go on the title. 
18. Respondent acknowledged she was aware it was important to Petitioner to have his name 
on the title, and that he periodically raised this issue. Although Respondent pointed to the two 
re-financings of the house as evidence that Petitioner had opportunity to arrange "to pay her for 
her equity" had he chosen to do so, she also acknowledged that she never identified for Petitioner 
a specific amount of money that would satisfy her in order to get his name on the title. She also 
acknowledged that she never seriously pursued any efforts to put Petitioner on the title.9 
9The parties testified that on one occasion Respondent brought home some paperwork to 
refinance the house. However, Petitioner testified that "two days later" the papers were "gone" 
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19. Both parties testified that the issue of putting Petitioner's! name on the house title became 
an increasing source of contention between them over time. Petitioner also testified that if he had 
known Respondent wouldn't follow through with her representations regarding his equity interest 
in the house, he "would have made different financial choices." |For her part Respondent testified 
that if, at the beginning of the relationship, Petitioner had writteii a check towards the equity "I 
would have honored that commitment." However, as difficulties mounted in their relationship 
and their arguments increased, Respondent stated she felt "less inclined" to include Petitioner on 
the title to the house. 
20. The Court finds the testimony of Petitioner to be more credible than that of Respondent 
on the issue of Respondent's representations to Petitioner that sh0 would treat him equitably (on 
the issue of his interest in the home) if they ever separated. Petitioner had never been married, 
whereas Respondent had been through a divorce and a property division previously. Respondent 
therefore had a greater understanding of what a "split" between tliem would entail with respect to 
any distribution of property. 
21. The Court does not find credible Respondent's testimony Ithat she always conditioned her 
statements to Petitioner on his paying her for one-half of the equity in the home. Rather, the 
Court finds that as difficulties mounted between them, Respondeat never clearly conveyed her 
position with respect to what interest in the home, if any, she was| willing to convey to Petitioner, 
nor did she clearly specify what he had to do to secure that interest. Nevertheless, Petitioner 
and nothing was ever done. Nevertheless, Petitioner testified thatjthe fact that she had brought the 
papers home reassured him that "she understood his concern." 
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knowingly accepted his financial contributions that permanently improved the home. As more 
fully explained below, the evidence clearly establishes that Petitioner paid for significant 
improvements to the home premised on his mistaken belief that he was accumulating an equity 
interest in the home. 
22. For his part, Petitioner never took the initiative to ensure that steps were taken to clarify 
his position or secure his interest. Although the parties agree that the issue of Petitioner's name 
on the home's title was an important matter to him, during their time together Petitioner never 
took affirmative steps to have the home appraised. Therefore, there is no information available 
by which the Court can assess how his various contributions enhanced the value of the property. 
Similarly, he never initiated contacts with any banks or mortgage companies to explore what 
would be involved in arranging for a transfer of title to joint tenancy, co-tenancy, or some other 
means for securing his interest. The closest the parties ever came to any such efforts is 
referenced at note 9, supra, when Respondent brought home some papers for a possible 
refinancing that was intended to include Petitioner as an equity interest holder. During the entire 
time that Petitioner and Respondent co-habited, Respondent refinanced the home twice but 
Petitioner apparently chose not take those opportunities to resolve his concerns one way or 
another. 
23. The parties began experiencing difficulties in 2001, which were exacerbated by their 
dispute over the house.10 They began sleeping in different parts of the house. While there was 
10Respondent testified that Petitioner "stopped doing anything in the house" and stopped 
participating in making joint decisions for the care of Stephanie. Although Respondent 
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disputed testimony regarding the reasons for the separate sleeping arrangements, it is clear that 
the parties' intimate relationship terminated sometime around th^t time. In any event, it 
terminated substantially earlier than when Petitioner actually mo^ed out in Aug. 2005. 
24. Respondent testified that between the time of her divorcel in 1991, and the time Petitioner 
moved in (in 1995), she had a tenant for six months. The tenant Iwas a friend; Respondent did 
not enter into a formal tenancy agreement with the tenant, but he [paid her $300 per month to rent 
her basement. 
25. As part of these proceedings the home at issue was appraised. The appraisal was 
completed on March 17, 2008 and concluded that the present market value of the home is 
$425,000. Neither party has contested the home's current value. 
26. Although the Court has before it evidence of the present \|alue for the home, no evidence 
was presented as to the actual value of the home on or about August, 1995, when Petitioner 
moved in, or of its value in August 2005, when Petitioner moved |out Indeed, there is no 
evidence before the Court as to what the house's value was in 19^1 when Respondent and her 
acknowledged that Petitioner "agreed with all her decisions regarding Stephanie and attended her 
activities, Respondent claims "he did not show interest in participating in the decision-making." 
Petitioner strongly disputes Respondent's claims in this regard. He acknowledges that even after 
there no longer was a romantic relationship between the two of them, they maintained a "cordial 
relationship in which they each participated" in Stephanie's life and activities. After hearing the 
testimony, observing the parties' demeanor, and making assessments of credibility, the Court 
does not find Respondent's contentions to be credible, at least not with respect to Stephanie. 
While the Court cannot determine the extent to which Petitioner did (or did not) contribute to the 
maintenance of the home after the parties began experiencing difficulties, throughout the course 
of this case it has been evident that Petitioner is (and has been) vefry interested in participating 
fully in his daughter's life. 
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first husband were divorced. Although they could have done so as part of the appraisal 
completed in March 2008, apparently neither party requested that the appraiser conduct 
retrospective appraisals of the property for any of those relevant times. 
27. Petitioner has presented the Court with detailed exhibits, not contested by Respondent, 
that over the years Petitioner paid her $71,100.00 in monthly payments towards the mortgage, see 
Ex.5; $960.03 towards "home maintenance," and $1,024.50 towards "lawn service." Ex.6-A. 
Petitioner also presented evidence (through photocopies of tissue copies of checks he'd written) 
of paying another $12,470 in other house expenses. The largest share of those is attributable to 
the nearly $9,000 in deck-related payments. Ex. 6-B. Although Respondent does not challenge 
this evidence of payments by Petitioner, in most cases the Court cannot discern from the exhibit 
whether those expenses were incurred for household improvements, or simply involved other 
expenses that are not related to an improvement to the house (e.g, check #438 for $30 with a 
"memo" note of "bed delivery"). In most cases there is no "memo" notation that explains the 
purpose for the expenditure; in many cases, the handwriting and/or amounts shown are difficult 
to discern clearly.11 
28. Of the various checks included in exhibit 6-B, there was direct trial testimony only with 
respect to two checks-#s 253 and 257-which Petitioner expressly identified as being the checks 
nThe exhibit consists of photocopies of "tissue paper" checks which the drafter keeps for 
record-keeping purposes. 
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he wrote to pay for the deck.12 Although there was no testimon^ offered as to checks #106 and 
#111, the exhibit copy of #111 shows "swamp cooler" written iii the "memo" section of the 
check; the check is written in the amount of $250. While this check does not expressly state that 
this expenditure was a purchase, the check carries a date of Sept 114, 2002. Exhibit 6-A then 
shows that beginning 2003 there are more modest entries for "hc^ me maintenance" of a swamp 
cooler. There are no entries related to a "swamp cooler" dating Earlier than September 2002. 
Check #106 includes a notation in the "memo" section that appears to read "Art Thoen." That 
check was written on Sept. 2, 2002 to Ace Conditioning & Heating, LLC, the same entity to 
which check #111 was written. Based on this evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from it, the Court believes it is more probable than not th^t the two checks-totaling 
$750-were for a home improvement expenditure (i.e., the purchase and installation of a swamp 
cooler), rather than simply a maintenance expense. The Court nc^ tes that both of these household 
improvement expenditures, as well as others (e.g., the purchase ^nd installation of a ceiling fan), 
were incurred after the parties' began experiencing difficulties ii^  their relationship and had 
ceased their romantic involvement with each other. 
29. The Court cannot, however, draw a similar conclusion frc^ m the remaining checks shown 
in exhibit 6-B. Two of those checks (#284 and 376) were writte^ to a "Bill Maynard" and 
total$725.00. However, there was no testimony establishing who "Bill Maynard" is nor what 
12Although the copy of check #253 has VOID written across it, Petitioner testified that 
was an overwrite of another check (252) which he had voided. According to Petitioner, check 
#253 itself was not voided but was, in fact, negotiated. Respondent presented no contrary 
evidence on this issue so the Court accepts Petitioner's testimony on this matter. 
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those expenditures were for. Similarly, check #444 is written to "Ron Slough" in the amount of 
$84. There is no notation as to the purpose of that expenditure. Given that there is at least one 
check included in this exhibit (check #438) does not appear to be for a home improvement, the 
Court cannot conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that those unlabeled and unexplained 
checks are directly related to home improvements. 
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
30, Utah law is clear that a trial court faced with a claim for equitable division of property 
must first determine "what property is premarital and what property is marital." Walters v. 
Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The home purchased by Respondent with her first 
husband, and which she acquired after purchasing her first husband's equity interest at the time 
of the divorce, is clearly "premarital" property. As a general rule, "premarital property is viewed 
as separate property, and equity usually requires that 'each party retain the separate property he or 
she brought into the marriage.'" Id, quotingHaumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). The rule "is not invariable" and the court must "consider all of the pertinent 
circumstances." Walters, 812 P.2d 64. Here, the posture of this case clearly affects the analysis 
the Court must follow. 
31. As referenced earlier, these parties never married, so there is no clear "marital" estate to 
divide. When the parties resolved their custody issues through mediation and the Court 
determined that Petitioner's common law marriage claim failed, this case lost its character as a 
"domestic" case. Nevertheless, because Petitioner had also included a third, "civil," claim 
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raising various equitable theories, the case continued to trial.13 Although the Petition alluded to 
various theories, in her closing argument Petitioner's counsel abandoned all theories except two: 
unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. 
32. For Various reasons more fully discussed below, the Courf; cannot conclude that Petitioner 
is entitled to any share of equity in the home. However, the Couitt concludes that he has stated a 
claim for unjust enrichment. 
33. To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Utah law, Petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing (a) that he conferred a benefit on Respondent, (b) th^t Respondent appreciated or 
had knowledge of the benefit received, and (c) that, under the circumstances, allowing 
Respondent to accept or retain that benefit without paying for its yalue would be inequitable. 
At a minimum, the evidence establishes that Petitioner paid $889|5 towards a new deck for the 
home. Although there is no evidence regarding what value the dick added towards the overall 
13Respondent argued repeatedly that with the resolution of the paternity issue and 
dismissal of the common law marriage claim, there was no legal rhook" on which to base 
Petitioner's equitable claim to an interest in Respondent's premarital property. Respondent's 
argument appears to be premised on her assumption that Petitioner's equitable claim is based on 
this being solely a "domestic" case. But, the Petition clearly raises three separate causes of 
action-two of which are "domestic" in character, and one of which is "civil" in character, raising 
claims of unjust enrichment and/or promissory estoppel, among others. Under the rules of civil 
procedure, "[t]he plaintiff in his complaint.. . may join either as: 
claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he ma)j ] 
parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 18(a). Alternatively, Petitioner certainl) 
civil action alleging unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, knd then moved to consolidate 
the action. See Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). Thus, while the Court agrees that Petitioner may not have 
a right to an equitable interest in her premarital property, Petitioner has an adequate legal basis 
for pursuing his equitable civil claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. To the 
extent he prevails in those claims, he can certainly pursue his judgment against any assets held by 
Respondent. 
independent or as alternate 
have against an opposing 
could have filed a separate 
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value of the home, there is no doubt that the $8895 was a benefit conferred upon Respondent, 
and one of which she had knowledge and appreciated as a benefit. Based on the above-stated 
Findings of Fact, the Court concludes it would be inequitable to allow Respondent to retain the 
nearly $9,000 benefit Petitioner conferred on her by paying for a new deck without reimbursing 
him for that cost he incurred. 
34. A similar analysis applies to other home improvements paid for by Petitioner, 
specifically, the $750 he expended for the purchase and installation of a swamp cooler and 
related costs, $312.00 towards a lawn sprinkler system, and $179.00 for the purchase and 
installation of a ceiling fan. The Court concludes that, in total, Petitioner benefitted 
Respondent's residence in the amount not less than $10,136.00. Therefore, Respondent should be 
held responsible for reimbursing Petitioner in full for that benefit. 
35. Although there is some evidence Petitioner actually contributed greater amounts than that 
towards improvements that could reasonably be expected to increase the value of the home, the 
Court cannot conclude that Petitioner met his burden of proof as to those greater amounts. 
Specifically, the Court has determined that of the $960.03 referenced in Ex. 5 as "Steve's 
contribution" to "home maintenance," $491.25 was properly an improvement to the home rather 
than just maintenance, but $468.78 cannot be so considered and is therefore disallowed. The 
Court also disallows Petitioner's contribution of $1,024.50 towards a "lawn service" as 
referenced in Ex. 5. The Court classifies this as a home maintenance expense. While home 
maintenance expenses tend to contribute to maintaining the overall value of the home, they do 
not generally enhance that value. Therefore, the Court concludes that it is unable to estimate how 
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those expenses conferred a specific benefit upon Respondent whiph in fairness she should be 
required to repay. 
36. A closer issue is whether, under an unjust enrichment theory, Petitioner should be entitled 
to claim reimbursement (or a share in the equity of the home) for I some or all of the documented 
$71,100.00 which he paid Respondent towards the mortgage during their 10 year co-habitation. 
The Court concludes that Petitioner may not recover any part of those payments. 
37. Petitioner is not entitled to full credit for those payments because, if he had not been 
living with Respondent, Petitioner would have incurred a housing expense elsewhere-whether as 
rent or as a mortgage payment. Thus, he would have had to mak^ at least comparable-if not 
greater-payments elsewhere. If those payments had gone for rent, no equity would have accrued 
to Petitioner. Although there is limited evidence before the Couift regarding how his payments 
compare to fair rental value for the home, the best evidence of how Petitioner valued the cost of 
his housing is shown by the amounts he actually paid Respondent towards the mortgage. Prior to 
Petitioner moving in, Respondent had rented a portion of her horjie for $300 per month. When 
Petitioner moved in a few years later, he began paying Respondeat $400 per month. Thereafter, 
he periodically increased those payments-first to $550, and then |to $650 per month. After 
moving out of the home, Petitioner rented an apartment for whicji he currently pays $750 per 
month. Thus, it appears that the amounts Petitioner contributed ^nonthly are in line with what his 
rental costs would have been if he had rented a house or apartment somewhere close-by to where 
his daughter was living. 
38. Petitioner claims that if he had understood he was not accruing equity he would have 
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organized his finances in some other fashion, and perhaps purchased a separate residence. 
Petitioner's statements of intent notwithstanding, the Court cannot give great credence to those 
claims. The fact is that Petitioner provided no evidence at trial that during the time the parties 
were co-habiting he had the financial wherewithal either to pay a down payment on a separate 
residence or to secure a mortgage solely in his name. Moreover, Petitioner's failure to take any 
steps to address an issue which he has testified was of such importance to him (i.e., the 
opportunity to accrue equity in a home), suggests that Petitioner was not in a position to make his 
desires a reality by qualifying for a separate mortgage.14 Thus, the Court cannot conclude that 
Petitioner was in a financial position where he would have been able to accrue equity at a 
separate residence had he not been misled by Respondent. Even if he had presented adequate 
evidence to prove he could have purchased a residence, the Court concludes that Petitioner has 
failed to prove that he would have accrued $71,100.00 worth of equity in a residence. Because 
there is no evidence of attempts by Petitioner to negotiate a mortgage, it is totally speculative 
what type of mortgage he would have qualified for, and what portion of his monthly payments 
would have gone towards equity-accruing principal versus debt service on the mortgage. 
Therefore the Court cannot begin to assess what portion of those payments could have created a 
partial equity interest for Petitioner had they been re-directed to purchasing a separate residence. 
39. In sum, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that any portion of the $71,100 in payments he made to Respondent unjustly enriched 
14Support for this conclusion is found in the fact that Petitioner is still renting, instead of 
purchasing, a residence. 
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her to his detriment, and that in fairness and equity he should be Reimbursed for those payments. 
40. The Court also concludes that the remaining expenses fori which Petitioner claims 
credit-specifically, the majority of home maintenance and lawn Service expenses-fall in the 
category of normal living expenses. These expenses yielded no ifteasurable long-term 
enhancement to Respondent's equity in the home. Thus, the Coi^ rt cannot find that Respondent 
was unjustly enriched by those expenditures incurred by Petitioner. 
41. Petitioner's other theory for recovery is promissory estoppel. To state a claim for 
promissory estoppel Petitioner must allege four elements: (1) that he acted with prudence and in 
reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant, (2) the 4efendant knew that the plaintiff 
had relied on the promise which the defendant should reasonably I expect to induce action on the 
part of Petitioner; (3) the Respondent was aware of all material f^cts; and (4) that Petitioner 
relied on the promise and the reliance resulted in a loss to him. Tjhe Court is not persuaded that 
Petitioner has carried his burden of proof to establish these elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence. But, even if the Court were to assume, for the sake of Argument, that Respondent in 
fact promised Petitioner that she would put his name on the title tfi the home without any 
preconditions, and that she was aware of all material facts at the tfme she made that promise, the 
Court still concludes that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of Establishing the other two prongs 
of promissory estoppel. Specifically, Petitioner has not shown he ^cted with prudence and in 
reasonable reliance of the alleged promise, nor has he shown thatjhis reliance resulted in a loss to 
him. 
42. As reflected in the Court's Findings of Fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner's actions 
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were "prudent." The Court believes that reasonably prudent person concerned with establishing 
an equity interest in a property into which he was investing funds would not have merely relied 
upon another to take the necessary steps to perfect that interest. Here, however, Petitioner took 
no such action to clarify what interest, if any, he was acquiring, nor to ensure that legal steps 
were taken to establish that interest. Similarly, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner's 
various payments towards the mortgage or living expenses resulted in a loss to him. As noted 
earlier, he would have incurred living expense regardless of where he lived, and the available 
evidence is that the payments he made were not in excess of what fair rental value would have 
been. Thus, he incurred no cognizable losses. 
43. On July 8, 2008 the Court conducted a telephonic conference with both counsel at which 
time the Court gave counsel an oral summary of its Findings and Conclusions. The Court also 
told counsel that it was finalizing a written decision stating with greater specificity the Court's 
analysis and determination. At that telephonic conference counsel for Petitioner asked the Court 
if it had considered Petitioner's contributions regarding the vehicle and if it had considered the 
issue of attorney's fees. The Court indicated that it had considered Petitioner's claims regarding 
the vehicle and was not persuaded by them. The Court believes it has adequately addressed the 
issue of the vehicle in these Findings of Fact, specifically, the findings reflected at note 5, supra. 
The Court hereby states its intent that note 5 (as well as other footnotes to the Court's decision) 
be considered fully a part of the Court's Findings of Fact. Based on those findings the Court 
concludes that Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he conferred 
on Respondent a measurable and particularized benefit through the occasional use of the vehicle 
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for family outings. Although the evidence at trial was limited at| best, Petitioner conceded that 
Respondent did not drive, did not have a drivers' license, and th^t taxis or mass transit formed 
her primary means of transportation to and from work. While th)e family went on outings 
together, the Court surmises that most of the transportation which Petitioner provided to 
Respondent as part of a family activity also included Stephanie. Petitioner would have provided 
transportation for himself and Stephanie in any event, so also transporting Respondent was, at 
most, an incidental benefit to her. Petitioner provided no evidence of times (if any) when he 
provided transportation to Respondent which he would not otheijwise have incurred. In short, the 
Court has no evidence before it that would allow computation off some percentage of car usage 
that directly benefitted Respondent. Without that basic information the Court cannot find that 
Respondent was "unjustly enriched" at Petitioner's expense. Therefore the Court declines to 
credit Petitioner for the costs he incurred in maintaining and operating his vehicle during the 
parties' time together. 
44. The Court does not recall the issue of attorney's fees beii^ g addressed at trial, but in any 
event the Court concludes that Petitioner has no basis for asserting such a claim. As indicated 
earlier, once the custody orders were entered in this case by stipulation and the Court granted 
summary judgment on the common law marriage claim, the character of the case as a domestic 
matter ended and the matter was tried as a civil claim for unjust Enrichment and/or promissory 
estoppel. Therefore, there was no claim for an equitable award of attorney's fees before the 
Court. Moreover, even if the paternity adjudication had provide4 grounds for an attorney's fee 
award, that adjudication was made early in the case by stipulation of the parties. Therefore, any 
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consideration of such fees would not have extended to include fees incurred in subsequent 
litigation. Additionally, at trial Petitioner presented no evidence that would have supported an 
attorney's fee award. To warrant an equitable award of attorney's fees in a domestic matter, the 
party seeking such an award bears the burden of showing a financial need for such an award, and 
the other party ability to afford the requested award. There was no testimony presented at trial on 
any of those issues. The only evidence arguably relevant to this determination would have been 
evidence that the parties had comparable levels of training and income. That is insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to establish any entitlement to an attorney's fee award. 
45. Moreover, because the issue at trial involved a civil claim, rather than one brought under 
divorce or paternity statutes, the American rule applies. Thus, each side is normally expected to 
bear its own attorney's fees unless there is a contractual or statutory basis for an attorney's fee 
award. In this case Petitioner abandoned any contract claim he may have had against Petitioner, 
choosing instead to rest on equitable claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. 
Petitioner has identified no other statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees. Therefore, the 
Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
46. As a final matter, pursuant to the parties' earlier stipulation the terms of the Temporary 
Order and Parenting Plan would become part of the permanent Paternity Order, (see Ex. 1 &3). 
Because Respondent's counsel will shortly be relocating out of state, Petitioner's counsel has 
agreed to assume responsibility for preparing an Order and Determination of Paternity 
incorporating the stipulated terms. 
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ORDER 
47. Petitioner's counsel to prepare and submit for the Court's Signature a final Order and 
Determination of Paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation. 
48. With respect to all other issues addressed in this decision incorporating Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, this shall be the final Order of th^ Court and no other form of 
order will need to be submitted by counsel. 
Entered by the Court this 9th day of July, 2009. 
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